Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2021

Talking Back in Court
M. Eve Hanan

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Judges
Commons, and the Law and Psychology Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository administered
by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact
youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

TALKING BACK IN COURT
M. Eve Hanan*
Abstract People charged with crimes often speak directly to the judge presiding over their
case. Yet, what can be seen in courtrooms across the U.S. is that defendants rarely “talk back”
in court, meaning that they rarely challenge authority’s view of the law, the crime, the
defendant, the court’s procedure, or the fairness of the proposed sentence.
With few exceptions, legal scholars have treated the occasions when defendants speak
directly to the court as a problem to be solved by appointing more lawyers and better lawyers.
While effective representation is crucial, this Article starts from the premise that defendants
have important things to say that currently go unsaid in court. In individual cases, talking back
could result in fairer outcomes. On a systemic level, talking back could bring much-needed
realism to the criminal legal system’s assumptions about crime and punishment that
produce injustice.
This Article analyzes three types of power that prevent defendants from talking back in
court: sovereign, disciplinary, and social-emotional power. While sovereign power silences
defendants through fear, disciplinary power silences defendants by imposing a system of order
within which talking back seems disorderly. Finally, social-emotional power silences
defendants by imposing an emotional regime in which self-advocacy is both a breach of
decorum and an affront to the court’s perception of itself as a source of orderliness and justice.
The dynamics of social-emotional power are particularly critical to evaluating court reform
efforts focused on improving courtroom culture. Paradoxically, the more solicitous the judge,
the less the defendant may feel comfortable raising concerns that challenge the court’s
narrative of justice.

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 494
I.
SPEAKING FOR THEMSELVES ............................................ 502
A. Defendants Without Lawyers ............................................. 505
B. What’s My Line: Defendants Speaking in Court ............... 509
1. First Appearance, Pretrial Release and Bail Hearing,
and Arraignment ........................................................... 509
2. Plea Bargaining and Sentencing Hearings .................... 512
3. Status Hearings and Violation Hearings ....................... 519
II.
VIOLENCE, ORDER, AND TENDERNESS ........................... 521
A. Sovereign Power................................................................. 523
B. Disciplinary Power ............................................................. 525
*

Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Misdemeanor Clinic at the University of Nevada,
Las Vegas, Boyd School of Law, J.D., Michigan Law School. I thank Amber Baylor, Jenny Carroll,
Tim Casey, Erin Collins, Sara Hildebrand, Daniel Harawa, Frank Fritz, Thea Johnson, Benjamin
Levin, Binny Miller, Eric Miller, Renagh O’Leary, David Orentlicher, Nancy Rapoport, Jenny
Roberts, Kathryn Stanchi, David Tanenhaus, and Brian Wilson. I also thank the organizers of
CrimFest 2020, the Criminal Justice Section of the AALS junior scholars works-in-progress program,
and the Annual Works-in-Progress for the AALS Alternative Dispute Resolution section.

493

494

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:493

C. Social-Emotional Power ..................................................... 531
1. The Impact of Stigma on Courtroom Behavior ............ 531
2. Emotions that Threaten the Court’s Sense of Order ..... 535
D. Silencing in Kinder, Gentler Courts ................................... 539
IV. THE VALUE OF TALKING BACK ........................................ 547
A. The Perils and Potential for the Defendant......................... 549
B. Educating Legal Professionals ........................................... 554
C. Contestation and Democracy.............................................. 556
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 558
INTRODUCTION
Imagine this common occurrence in the lower, criminal courts: James
appeared in court at 8:00 a.m. to answer for two misdemeanor citations
for trespassing and disorderly conduct. He attempted to show his citations
to the court officer, who motioned for him to sit in the audience. At first,
James selected a seat in the first row. The court officer quickly approached
him, leaned over, and told him the first row was reserved for lawyers.
James next selected the back row. While James waited, he watched the
court officer admonish other members of the audience—defendants and
their families—for speaking. James waited until 10:00 a.m. for his case to
be called.
When his case was called, the judge instructed James to stand on an
“X” made of masking tape on the floor between the tables where the
public defender and the prosecutor sat. The prosecutor read the charges.
The judge asked James if he understood the charges. James said yes. The
judge asked the prosecutor if she was seeking jail time. The prosecutor
said no and added that the state was prepared to offer James a conditional
dismissal if he agreed to pay $500 in fines and stay out of trouble for six
months. The judge explained to James that if he pleaded guilty to both
charges today, the conviction would be suspended until the six-month
status date. If James paid the $500 fine by the due date and avoided arrest,
the case would be dismissed. If he failed to pay the $500 or picked up new
criminal charges, the dismissal would convert into a conviction that would
go on his record. James asked if he could get a lawyer. The court explained
that, because the state was not seeking jail time, he did not qualify for a
public defender. However, he was free to hire a lawyer and come back to
court with his lawyer on another date. The judge asked James if he
understood the offer. James accepted the plea offer by saying yes.
The minute-long hearing that adjudicated James’s case is replicated in
criminal courts across the United States every day. People charged with
crimes agree to the terms of the plea offer and resolve their cases without
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advocating for themselves in any meaningful way.1 Most legal scholarship
critical of criminal court practice would frame James’s problem as an
issue of inadequate access to defense counsel,2 coercive plea bargaining,3
or excessive fines.4 All of these critiques are fundamentally correct and
important to analyzing injustice in criminal legal practices.5 What has
received much less scholarly attention, however, is what defendants say
and do not say during brief moments in which they speak directly to the
court.6 These moments of interaction strike me as critical and
understudied aspects of criminal legal practices.
Defendants in criminal cases rarely contest the process or disposition
of the case, even when they are called upon to speak.7 They agree to plead
guilty, to waive rights, pay fines, attend courses, and then they thank the
court and leave. Defendants rarely talk back in court.8 By talking back, I
1. My experience in criminal court is derived from practicing as a public defender in Massachusetts,
Washington, D.C., and Maryland, as well as supervising law students’ clinical legal education in
Maryland and Nevada. James’s case is a composite of cases that are resolved in a similar manner
every day in the lower courts.
2. See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 297–303 (2011) (discussing the need for standards to
guide defense counsel representing clients in misdemeanor cases in light of the serious collateral
consequences of conviction).
3. See, e.g., Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV.
1303, 1311–15 (2018) (describing the unequal power dynamics in plea bargaining). Thea Johnson
describes how plea bargaining often eclipses the fact-finding goals of criminal courts. Thea Johnson,
Fictional Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855, 857 (2019).
4. See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause Challenging the Modern Debtors’
Prison, 65 UCLA L. REV. 2, 7–9 (2018) (describing pervasive harm caused by criminal fines).
5. I use the phrase “criminal legal practices” instead of the “criminal justice system” or “criminal
legal system” because the multiplicity of laws, courts, and practices cannot be described as a “system”
at all. See Sara Mayeux, The Idea of “The Criminal Justice System,” 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 65 (2018);
John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by a Metaphor A Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 1087, 1089 (2013) (“The criminal justice ‘system’ in the United States . . . is not a ‘system’
at all, but rather a chaotic swirl of local, county, state, and (less frequently) federal actors, all with
different constituencies and incentives.”).
6. An exception is Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449 (2005) (arguing that the direct speech of defendants has value independent of
their attorney’s ability to speak on their behalf). In the critical misdemeanor literature,
self-representation is most often discussed within the context of the right to counsel and to effective
representation. See, e.g., Erica Hashimoto, The Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1024 (2013) (discussing self-representation in misdemeanors).
7. See infra section I.B.
8. See BELL HOOKS, TALKING BACK: THINKING FEMINIST, THINKING BLACK 5 (1989) (defining
talking back as speaking to a person in authority as an equal). Note that bell hooks is a pen name that
the author prefers never to be capitalized. Min Jin Lee, In Praise of bell hooks, N.Y. TIMES: THE
ENTHUSIAST (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/books/bell-hooks-min-jin-leeaint-i-a-woman.html [https://perma.cc/N3HT-5CKQ] (noting how hooks “wanted her pen name to be
spelled in lowercase to shift the attention from her identity to her ideas”). I use the verb, to “contest,”
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do not mean making a scene and risking being found in contempt of court
(although fear of being found in contempt surely causes many defendants
to hold their tongue). In her classic work on Black feminist thought, bell
hooks describes “talking back” as “speaking as an equal to an authority
figure.”9 hooks draws a contrast between the act of talking back and a
constellation of kinds of “silence,” which includes speaking in ways that
say nothing to contest authority.10 In other words, silence encompasses
not only holding one’s tongue but also speaking in ways that are compliant
while refraining from speech that might disrupt or challenge authority.
James, for example, may have possessed information and perspectives
important to the procedural and substantive issues in his case. He could
have raised issues related to police conduct during the traffic stop, the
facts alleged in the citation, or the fine amount set by the court. The fine
of $500 may have worked insurmountable hardship for James. A critical
challenge to the court’s calculus in setting a fine could have been mounted
by James simply saying, “If I have to pay $500, I won’t have enough
money for gas to take my kids to school.” These sorts of challenges to the
court’s narrative, however, often go unsaid.
Numerous factors must push defendants to silence. In addition to more
obvious reasons,11 I argue that there are three pernicious forms of power
that work invisibly to ensure that defendants do not talk back to contest
either their guilt or the terms of the disposition.12 My hypothesis builds on
the work of Issa Kohler-Hausmann, whose research in courts that handle
misdemeanor cases led her to conclude that misdemeanor defendants are
perceived as fundamental challenges to the public order.13 As such,
courtroom procedures and the sanctions imposed are tests of the
defendant’s ability to demonstrate orderliness. I argue that the defendant’s
efforts to appear orderly preclude talking back. Everything that happens
from the moment defendants enter the courtroom signals that their
orderliness is being tested, and, thus, they should be obedient, quiet, and
and its noun, “contestation,” interchangeably with “talking back.” To contest is to “call in question,
dispute.” WALTER W. SKEAT, AN ETYMOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 132
(1888). The word derives from the Latin word contestari, which means “to call to witness.” Id.
Contestation is thus tied firmly to speech, to providing information or testifying.
9. HOOKS, supra note 8, at 5.
10. Id. at 6.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part II.
13. ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN
AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 5 (2018); cf. Sandra G. Mayson & Megan T. Stevenson,
Misdemeanors by the Numbers, 61 B.C. L. REV. 971, 982 (2020) (noting that, while many
misdemeanor cases fit with the “managerial model” of order policing, other crimes, such as “theft,
simple assault, and DUI” suggest more typical concerns of criminal legal systems).
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agreeable. Insofar as they speak, they must follow the unwritten script
of compliance.
I then argue that the fear of punishment is not the only factor pressuring
defendants into an orderly and compliant performance. Rather, silent
compliance is enforced through three related types of power—sovereign,
disciplinary, and social-emotional—that work in tandem to encourage
defendants to assent to all terms and accept all responsibility for failures
to comply.14 Sovereign power is the most obvious. It is the fear of the
sovereign’s power to punish through incarceration or other sanctions. In
contrast, disciplinary power controls the individual by imposing a system
of order.15 While defendants may behave orderly out of fear that the
sovereign will exercise its power to incarcerate, they may also behave
orderly out of more of a social sense that they are being observed,
monitored, and judged on their conduct. The procedures of the courtroom
that encourage orderliness in this subtler way are a kind of
disciplinary power.
Most overlooked among these three types of power that work to silence
defendants is what I call social-emotional power, which imposes
parameters around what types of emotions and social interactions are
considered polite and permissible.16 Courtrooms permit a narrow range of
emotional expression.17 If no one—including lawyers—appears spirited
or outraged during their court hearings, defendants usually will conform
their conduct and speech to the cooperative (or acquiescing) emotional
tone of the courtroom. Likewise, if the judge seems short-tempered, the
defendant may be hesitant to say anything that could provide the
court’s ire.
Paradoxically, the pressure to be agreeable may be enhanced in courts
that appear the most respectful and solicitous toward defendants because
contestation seems wholly inappropriate in such a friendly environment.
While courtroom culture varies widely, trends toward greater procedural
justice and therapeutic jurisprudence have led some judges to cultivate an
atmosphere of empathy and cooperation in their courtrooms.18 The
vanguard of this trend is the problem-solving court movement, in which
14. See infra section II.A.
15. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 13, at 8–9.
16. Emotions are social insofar as they are shaped by “anthropological, social and historical”
context. Veronika Magyar-Haas, Shame as an Anthropological, Historical and Social Emotion, in
SHAME AND SOCIAL WORK: THEORY, REFLEXIVITY AND PRACTICE 55, 57 (Liz Frost et al. eds., 2020)
(discussing variations in the experience and expression of shame).
17. See, e.g., Terry A. Maroney, The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion, 99 CALIF.
L. REV. 629, 633–35 (2011) (describing how, while litigation involves emotions, judges and other
legal professionals adhere to the belief that emotion has no place in their courtroom functioning).
18. See infra section II.B.
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the defining feature of the court’s design is its attempt to ameliorate a
discrete problem like drug addiction.19 Scholars of problem-solving courts
have noted that even lawyers may feel pressured not to contest the process
or the outcome in courtrooms that emphasize cooperation.20 In these
courts, the social-emotional power that keeps defendants from talking
back may be entirely invisible. Defendants will feel pressure to acquiesce
through diffuse social-emotional cues to cooperate. I thus reject the
argument that kinder, gentler courts will elicit information from
defendants that is necessary to make fair decisions and to avoid
unintended harm.21
Concern over constraints on defendants’ ability to talk back applies to
felony as well as misdemeanor cases. As I have written elsewhere,
defendants often speak during their sentencing hearings, yet the speech
that is demanded of them is highly scripted—an expression of remorse
and responsibility for the crime.22 Defendants in felony cases may also be
called upon to speak about their work, family, and living arrangements
during bail and pretrial release hearings.23 And, defendants may elect to
represent themselves in both misdemeanor and felony cases provided the
court finds them competent to do so.24 Finally, in some instances,
defendants may seek to use their criminal trials to make a political

19. Jessica M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 595, 603–05 (2016)
(describing the emergence of drug courts as part of an effort to separate from the general docket cases
in which the defendant’s crimes were driven by substance abuse).
20. Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public Defender About Drug
Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 37, 47 (2000) (discussing the pressure
on defense attorneys to behave as team members rather than as adversaries); Tamar M. Meekins,
“Specialized Justice” The Over-Emergence of Specialty Courts and the Threat of the New Criminal
Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 38 (2006) (arguing that specialty courts divest defense
attorneys of their adversarial function and adopt the role of encouraging the defendant to comply with
the court-ordered treatment).
21. My argument about the social-emotional constraints in the courtroom is different from the
argument that emotions form the primary mechanism of power in problem-solving courts. Cf. Rekha
Mirchandani, Beyond Therapy Problem-Solving Courts and the Deliberative Democratic State, 33
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 853, 869 (2008) (challenging the hypothesis that emotions are the primary
mechanism of power in therapeutic jurisprudence and observing that the judge in a problem-solving
court in Salt Lake City used techniques of rational inquiry in addition to emotional engagement).
22. See M. Eve Hanan, Remorse Bias, 83 MO. L. REV. 301, 323–28 (2018); see also Susan A.
Bandes, Remorse and Judging, in REMORSE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 13–15), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3535062
[https://perma.cc/Q4G5-EUCB]; M. CATHERINE GRUBER, “I’M SORRY FOR WHAT I’VE DONE”: THE
LANGUAGE OF COURTROOM APOLOGIES 152–53 (2014) (concluding that a “ritualized apology
formula” “appears to be expected” at sentencing).
23. AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA HOLDS COURT 106–07 (2009) (describing
how a judge held defendant on an unaffordable bail until he agreed to provide truthful answers to
questions about his work, school, age, and probation status).
24. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
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statement, waiving or minimizing their exercise of procedural rights—
including their right to counsel—in order to present a counter-narrative.25
The issue of the defendant’s silence is, however, more prominent in
misdemeanor cases for two reasons. First, defendants charged with
misdemeanors are less likely to be represented by counsel.26 Second,
misdemeanors have a dramatic impact on millions of people because they
are prosecuted in both state court and municipal courts that have
jurisdiction over city code violations as well as misdemeanor crimes.27
Recent critiques of misdemeanor legal practices have thoroughly explored
many aspects of this outsized segment of criminal legal practices.28 They
constitute the bulk of prosecutions in state courts.29 Misdemeanor cases
fuel mass incarceration through initial arrest, bench warrants, pretrial
detention due to unaffordable bail, and jail sentences for low-level
offenses.30 Misdemeanor cases fuel mass convictions through quickly
bargained guilty pleas that are completed in a hearing that lasts less than
three minutes.31 While misdemeanor prosecutions are less likely to result
25. See Jenny E. Carroll, The Resistance Defense, 64 ALA. L. REV. 589, 599 (2013) (describing the
“resistance defense” in which defendants seek to “compel acknowledgment of the procedural and
substantive shortcomings of the law that failed to account for their stories”).
26. See Hashimoto, supra note 6, at 1019–21 (discussing rates of self-representation in
misdemeanor cases).
27. See Alexandra Natapoff, Criminal Municipal Courts, 134 HARV. L. REV. 964, 975–78 (2021)
(describing the prevalence and scope of municipal courts); id. at 968 (noting that, in municipal courts,
“defense attorneys are scarce to nonexistent”).
28. See Jenny Roberts, Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1091
(2013) (stating that “the current criminal justice crisis is more aptly characterized as one of mass
misdemeanor processing”); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313–14
(2012) (stating that “misdemeanor processing is the mechanism by which poor defendants of color
are swept up into the criminal system (in other words, criminalized) with little or no regard for their
actual guilt”); Megan Stevenson & Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L.
REV. 731, 734, 737 (2018) (stating that three misdemeanor charges are filed for every one felony
charge, totaling more than 13.2 million misdemeanor cases filed per year).
29. Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 13, at 975 (noting that more than 75% of all criminal cases
are misdemeanors); Alexandra Natapoff, The Penal Pyramid, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE
THINKING 71, 72 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017) (describing criminal
prosecutions as a pyramid in which the wide base is made up of misdemeanor cases).
30. Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 307, 337–39 (2016) (critiquing arrest in
instances in which the suspect can be issued a citation with a court date for arraignment). See generally
Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2015); JANELLE DUDA-BANWAR & JESSICA
BURT, CTR. FOR PUB. SAFETY INITIATIVES, DEP’T OF CRIM. JUST., ROCHESTER INST. OF TECH.,
LIVING WITH WARRANTS: LIFE UNDER THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES (2019) (analyzing the practice and
impact of bench warrants in Monroe County, New York); Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan
Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV.
711, 776 (2017) (discussing data demonstrating effects of pretrial detention on plea bargaining).
31. Alexandra Natapoff, Aggregation and Urban Misdemeanors, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1043,
1069 (2013). A study of 1,649 misdemeanor cases in various Florida counties found that 82% of the
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in incarceration than felony prosecutions, sub-carceral sanctions can be
devastating. By sub-carceral sanctions, I mean any imposed punishment
other than incarceration, including, for example, fines, fees, monitoring
requirements, mandatory therapeutic programs, and community service.
Sub-carceral sanctions are often onerous, draining defendants of money
and time while they labor to comply under the constant threat of
incarceration if they fail.32 These convictions often result in devastating
collateral consequences.33 The burdens of misdemeanor prosecution fall
disproportionately on Black and Latinx people, who are stopped by police,
ticketed, arrested, detained, prosecuted, and punished at higher rates than
other racial and ethnic groups.34
In these cases, it seems that defendants rarely tell the court they are
simply unable to pay monetary fees or to arrange the transportation to get
to a court-ordered class.35 While no quantitative studies of defendant
speech exist, ethnographies of courtroom culture are peppered with
examples of unsatisfying interactions between judges and defendants.36
A defendant’s silence is costly to both the defendant and our
arraignment hearings lasted less than three minutes and 91% lasted less than five minutes. ALISA
SMITH & SEAN MADDAN, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THREE-MINUTE JUSTICE: HASTE AND
WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 15 (2011), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/eb3
f8d52-d844-487c-bbf2-5090f5ca4be3/three-minute-justice-haste-and-waste-in-florida-smisdemeanor-courts.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WZE-RPWM]. Over two-thirds of the arraignments
included a guilty plea. Id. at 9. As the authors put it, “[d]efendants who interact with the criminal
justice system spend a great deal of time driving to the courthouse, parking, and sitting in court waiting
for the judge to take the bench in exchange for three-minute hearings.” Id. at 14.
32. See Laura I. Appleman, Nickel and Dimed into Incarceration Cash-Register Justice in the
Criminal System, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1483, 1485 (2016).
33. Jenny Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 176 (2017);
Roberts, supra note 2, at 297–303.
34. Mason & Stevenson, supra note 13, at 979 (describing how the “weight of this gargantuan
[misdemeanor] apparatus falls heavily on the poor and on people of color”).
35. The extensiveness of direct conversations between defendants and judges was not
problematized in the literature that predated the boom in critiques of misdemeanor courts, likely
because the stakes of sub-carceral sanctions were perceived as too low to trigger constitutional
concerns. Natapoff, supra note 28, at 1315 (arguing that people charged with misdemeanors “are
largely ignored by the criminal literature and policymakers, they are nevertheless punished,
stigmatized, and burdened by their convictions in many of the same ways as their felony
counterparts”). The exception to this observation is scholarly and advocacy concern about how
defendants’ expressions of remorse and pleas for mercy are perceived by judges at sentencing. Hanan,
supra note 22, at 323–28; Bandes, supra note 22, at 10–14; GRUBER, supra note 22, at 152–53.
36. See generally KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 13 (discussing results of the author’s
mixed-method study of New York City’s lower courts); NICOLE GONZALES VAN CLEVE, CROOK
COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT (2016) (discussing the
author’s ethnographic study of Cook County Court in Illinois); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS
IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1992) (discussing the author’s
study of a lower court in Connecticut); BACH, supra note 23, at 17 (reporting on the author’s eight-year
journalistic investigation into various U.S. criminal courts).
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understanding of the injustices perpetrated by criminal legal practices.37
Silence prevents defendants from contesting aspects of the proceedings
that are unfair or harmful to them. This may lead to worse outcomes in
their cases, but it also functions as part of a larger, well-documented
struggle over “narrative social power” in which the experiences of those
targeted by criminal laws are ignored and devalued.38
In contrast, talking back allows defendants to be active participants in
the public discussion of their cases.39 Talking back illuminates criminal
legal practices that are unjust, serving as an important check on
institutional power. The lower courts historically have had the potential to
be a “site of contestation” where power manifests not only in the outcome
of cases but in courtroom performance.40 Just as they are sites where
people are prosecuted, lower courts are sites where people may be able to
make “room for themselves” by asserting rights and making claims.41 In
this sense, talking back in court can be viewed as part of an important
component of resistance to criminal legal practices closely tied to the U.S.
history of slavery, convict leasing, and segregation.42 Yet, these moments
of potential resistance are Janus-like. While they contain the potential for
contestation, they are tightly regulated by layers of power, some visible
and some obscured.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of trial
37. See M. Eve Hanan, Invisible Prisons, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1185, 1219 (2020) (noting that
the silencing of prisoners’ speech obscures the harms of incarceration); Natapoff, supra note 6,
at 1457.
38. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1453.
39. Id. at 1452.
40. MARTHA S. JONES, BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENS: A HISTORY OF RACE AND RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM
AMERICA 126 (2018).
41. Id. at 11 (quoting BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 98–106 (2001)); id. at
65–67 (describing the contradictory nature of the lower courts in Baltimore during the Antebellum
period when free Black people were both prosecuted and asserted their rights in civil proceedings,
demonstrating how rights and power shift in individual cases even when the larger, legal structure
denies rights).
42. See, e.g., Chaz Arnett, Race, Surveillance, Resistance, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103, 1137–38 (2020)
(discussing Black resistance to state surveillance in both historical and current contexts); Monica C.
Bell, The Community in Criminal Justice Subordination, Consumption, Resistance, and
Transformation, 16 DU BOIS REV. 197, 206–07 (2019) (describing Black men running from the police
as a form of resistance); Kathryn Miller, The Myth of Autonomy Rights 55–59 (Nov. 5, 2020)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that the defendant’s assertion of trial rights
can best be understood within the historical framework of resistance to slavery); Alice Ristroph,
Regulation or Resistance? A Counter-Narrative of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 95 B.U. L.
REV. 1555, 1564 (2015) [hereinafter Ristroph, Regulation] (arguing that “[r]ights claims [under the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments] are a form of resistance to the state”); Alice Ristroph, Respect
and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 601, 605 (2009) [hereinafter Ristroph,
Respect] (arguing that “the Hobbesian right to resist punishment provides a useful conceptualization
of what it means to treat wrongdoers with respect”).
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court procedure that highlights why defendants are in a position to speak
directly to the court, particularly in misdemeanor cases in which
defendants are more likely to either not have a lawyer or to speak for
themselves despite having lawyers appointed. I point out how defendant
speech could provide important information to the proceeding. Part II
describes how sovereign, disciplinary, and social-emotional power work
to press defendants into performances of orderliness that preclude talking
back, with particular emphasis on the way in which socio-emotional
power can shape behavior and speech to conform with the tone of the
courtroom. Part III elaborates on the ethical and epistemic importance of
defendant speech and argues that contestation in the courtroom is essential
to understanding and remedying injustices.
I.

SPEAKING FOR THEMSELVES

This Part describes structural features of criminal cases that make it
possible and desirable, yet exceedingly difficult, for defendants to talk
back in court. I begin with an overview of the law and courtroom practices
that result in criminal defendants speaking directly to the court for the
reader unfamiliar with criminal proceedings. Defendants represent
themselves for a variety of reasons. Some defendants are not
constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel, others face practical
impediments to exercising their right to counsel, and others decline
counsel. I then discuss the life of a criminal case to point out the moments
at which both unrepresented and represented defendants may talk directly
to the court, what they are expected to say, and what benefit might derive
from talking back.
In the intellectual framework of bell hooks, the opposite of talking back
is not silence but following the script: “I was never taught absolute silence,
I was taught that it was important to speak but to talk a talk that was in
itself a silence.”43 One thus finds that it is not quite right to say that
defendants are speechless, even though they may be admonished by the
judge and their lawyers (if they have lawyers) to be silent.44 Speaking is
no better than silence if one is just following a script that does not
challenge the court’s decision, narrative, or practice.
Defendants say things that accord with the court’s script, whether
because their lawyers insist, or because they pick up on the cues and
power dynamics of the court.45 M. Catherine Gruber ultimately came to
this conclusion in her study of federal sentencing hearings. During their
43. HOOKS, supra note 8, at 7.
44. Cf. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1449–50 (stating that defendants rarely speak in court).
45. See infra Part III.
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sentencing allocutions, most defendants seem to know that an expression
of remorse is what is called for.46 Gruber concluded that the right to speak
at sentencing is not a right to speak one’s mind because that might lead to
more punishment.47 Rather, the allocution is part of the play, a speech
designed to validate the proceedings through the defendant’s acceptance
of the judgment and punishment.48 The defendant is called upon to speak
only in ways that “validat[e] a system in need of reform.”49 In this regard,
Gruber’s observations accord with Michel Foucault’s historical account
of “gallows speeches,” in which the condemned admitted his
responsibility for the crime and the fairness of the punishment just before
being put to death.50 The gallows speech, like the scripted speech expected
of today’s defendants, was designed to assure the listener that the sentence
of death was fair.
Conversely, in some instances, refusing to speak when called upon to
recite a script can be more of a challenge to criminal legal practices than
scripted speech. Silence can be resistance.51 This was well understood in
English criminal legal practices in William Blackstone’s time.52 Lord
Blackstone recounts defendants being crushed under heavy weights if
they refused to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty at arraignment.53 The
heavy weights—peine forte et dure—were not intended as a punishment,
but rather as a literal pressure to force the defendant to speak at
arraignment, indicating acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction.54 The
defendant would be released from torture if they agreed to plead guilty or
not guilty. If, on the other hand, the defendant did not agree to enter a plea,
they would be crushed to death by the weight.55 While silent refusals are
not a focus of this Article, their mention helps to show that the
speech/silence divide is not the issue. The issue is whether defendants can
speak to authority in the courtroom in ways that advance their interests
46. See GRUBER, supra note 22, at 146–47.
47. Id. at 160.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 65 (Alan Sheridan
trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1975).
51. See, e.g., Eric J. Miller, Encountering Resistance Contesting Policing and Procedural Justice,
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 302–03 (2016) (arguing that silence functions as resistance within the context
of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination).
52. KATHRYN TEMPLE, LOVING JUSTICE: LEGAL EMOTIONS IN WILLIAM BLACKSTONE’S
ENGLAND 125 (2019) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *319).
53. Id.
54. BLACKSTONE, supra note 52, at *318–20, *322; TEMPLE, supra note 52, at 136 (noting that
peine forte et dure “forces [defendants] to express their compliance with authority”).
55. BLACKSTONE, supra note 52, at *322.
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and challenge the process.
While lawyers speak for their clients’ interests, I wish to reiterate that
the orientation of this Article is not the importance of effective assistance
of counsel for all defendants. Acknowledging both the gravity of the
consequences of misdemeanor cases and the ameliorating effects of
advocacy, misdemeanor scholars have called for effective
representation.56 Better representation could be accomplished through
increased funding for public defense, enhanced cultures of excellence in
public defender offices,57 pooling and sharing of defender resources,58
and, of course, prosecutorial changes that reduce the numbers of
misdemeanor cases prosecuted.59
Conscientious lawyers are careful to relay their clients’ concerns to the
court, and to amplify their clients’ voices without distorting their
meaning.60 Zealous representation, however, does not necessarily address
56. Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738, 738 (2017)
(arguing that public defender offices should not neglect misdemeanor cases); Roberts, supra note 28,
at 1097–100 (discussing the value in advocacy to slow down the flood of misdemeanor cases);
Hashimoto, supra note 6, at 1019. The American Bar Association (ABA) has argued that the solution
to failures to provide counsel and inadequate counsel is to better fund public defenders and court
appointed counsel, to limit their caseloads, to ensure their independence, and to provide them with
standards, training and oversight. AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE
41–43 (2004) [hereinafter ABA SCLAID].
57. Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L. REV.
1769, 1781, 1784 (2016) (arguing that sub-standard indigent defense is exacerbated by a culture of
defeatism spurred by a combination of underfunding and structural impediments to
zealous representation).
58. In another article, I address the benefits of statewide public defender offices for pooling
resources, establishing a culture of advocacy, and shoring up political power to secure funding and
mandate. Eve Hanan, Big Law, Public Defender-Style: Aggregating Resources to Ensure Uniform
Quality of Representation, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 420 (2018).
59. See, e.g., FAIR & JUST PROSECUTION, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. & THE JUST. COLLABORATIVE,
21 PRINCIPLES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY PROSECUTOR 5, 10 (2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/publications/FJP_21Principles_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5N6H-NUE3]
(encouraging prosecutors to critically evaluate whether to file charges in certain cases, and especially
in misdemeanor cases).
60. While narrative has long been an important part of legal advocacy, some legal scholars began
in the 1990s to explicitly argue that lawyers should amplify their clients’ stories rather than
supplanting them with the lawyer’s narrative. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn
The Story of Josephine V., 4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 619, 632 (1991) (encouraging lawyering strategies
that “affirm a client world infused with the values of autonomy, community, and participation”). For
a thorough discussion of the relationship between the client’s story and the lawyer’s construction of
a successful theory of the case, see Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives Recognizing Client
Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994). Centering the defendant’s narrative in case
theory is part of a broader move toward client-centered lawyering. See Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress
in the Sand The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 371,
375–400 (2006) (describing the history and scope of influence of the concept of client-centered
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the concern that this Article raises about how defendants are restrained
from talking back in court. Speaking for oneself in court has inherent
value, which is reflected in the constitutional right to represent oneself,61
and to testify at trial.62 It is also reflected in the federal rule-based right to
speak at one’s sentencing hearing in order to “present information to
mitigate the sentence.”63 Moreover, as Professor Alexandra Natapoff has
so aptly put it, while attorneys speaking on behalf of their clients act as a
“proxy for defendant autonomy,”64 “[d]efendant speech . . . has personal,
dignitary, and democratic import beyond its instrumental role within the
criminal case.”65
A.

Defendants Without Lawyers

While anyone who can afford to hire an attorney is entitled to have
retained counsel represent them in criminal cases, the right of those who
cannot afford an attorney to have counsel appointed is more
circumscribed.66 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to appointed
counsel for anyone charged with a felony,67 and for anyone charged with
a misdemeanor who is facing loss of liberty.68 Thus, if the state is not
lawyering as “one of the most influential doctrines in legal education today”). The effectiveness of
attorneys telling client narratives may also be illustrated in the converse. See RACHEL SWANER,
CASSANDRA RAMDATH, ANDREW MARTINEZ, JOSEPHINE HAHN & SIENNA WALKER, CTR. FOR CT.
INNOVATION, WHAT DO DEFENDANTS REALLY THINK? PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND LEGITIMACY IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, at vii, 37 (2018) (surveying former defendants describing inability
to get a lawyer, speak to a public defender, or convey information through the lawyer to the court
before the entry of a guilty plea).
61. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (“The right to defend is personal.”). Note that
the right to self-representation may be curtailed if the court concludes that the defendant “lacks the
mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel.” Indiana v. Edwards, 554
U.S. 164, 176 (2008).
62. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987) (finding that a defendant in criminal case has right
to testify).
63. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(I)(4)(a)(ii).
64. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1482.
65. Id. at 1450.
66. Appointed counsel can be provided through three methods: (1) a county or state public defender
office staffed with full-time public defenders; (2) a system in which the county or state awards a
contract to an attorney or organization to represent some or all defendants who are deemed indigent;
or (3) a system in which individual private attorneys are assigned to and paid for individual cases.
Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 31 (1995).
67. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1963).
68. Right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution attaches only if the
defendant will be incarcerated after conviction. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 655–57 (2002)
(noting that defendants have a right to counsel if they may be sentenced to incarceration or receive a
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seeking jail time, the defendant is not entitled to a court-appointed
attorney.69 Often, the decision whether the defendant has the right to
appointed counsel occurs in the way described in the opening vignette of
James’s case.70 The prosecutor announces that the state is not seeking jail
time, and the court informs the defendant that counsel will not be
appointed. The sanctions that the court can impose on an uncounseled
defendant (who did not waive the right to counsel) are limited to
sub-carceral sanctions like fines and probationary terms.71 Of course,
states are free to provide greater rights to counsel than the federal
constitution requires,72 and the American Bar Association (ABA)
encourages local jurisdictions to appoint defense counsel in cases not
covered by constitutional mandate, particularly because convictions
trigger collateral consequences in the areas of immigration status,
employment and licensure, housing, and education, but jurisdictions
vary dramatically.73
Regardless of the source of the right to counsel—constitutional or
statutory—examples of courts failing to honor the right abound. Some
counties simply fail to provide defendants with counsel to which they are
entitled.74 In some cases, appointed counsel miss court dates, leaving

suspended sentence of incarceration); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that
“absent a knowing and intelligent waiver [of counsel], no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at
his trial”).
69. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 654, 655–57. In Florida, for example, the judge is required to certify that
she will not impose a sentence of incarceration in cases in which the defendant is not appointed
counsel. Hashimoto, supra note 6, at 1029.
70. See supra Part I.
71. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (holding that a defendant who was punished with
fine had no right to counsel even though the statute under which he was charged permits imprisonment
for the crime).
72. New York, for example, extends the right to counsel for all crimes. See Stream v. Beisheim,
311 N.Y.S.2d 542, 542 (App. Div. 1970); People v. Witenski, 207 N.E 2d 358, 360 (N.Y. 1965).
73. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST.: PROVIDING DEF. SERVS. § 5-1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1992)
[hereinafter ABA, PROVIDING DEF. SERVS.], https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publi
cations/criminal_justice_standards/providing_defense_services.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4KX-5QRS];
STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST.: DEF. FUNCTION § 4-1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1993) [hereinafter
ABA, DEF. FUNCTION], https://pdc.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2016/06/ABAStandardsf
ortheDefenseFunction.pdf [https://perma.cc/CBT7-PPTQ]; NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIM.
JUST. STANDARDS & GOALS, THE DEFENSE § 13.1 (NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N 1973)
[hereinafter NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N]; GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL DEF. SYS. IN THE U.S.
§ 1.1 (NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N 1976) [hereinafter GUIDELINES], https://www.americanb
ar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/death_penalty_representation/Standards/National/nladaguidelines-for-legal-defense-systems-1976.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YE7-R8QW].
74. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 33, at 186 (discussing South Carolina Supreme Court justice who
instructs lower court judges to ignore their constitutional obligation to appoint counsel in
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defendants to resolve their cases without representation.75 Some judges
have been observed pressuring defendants to waive their right to counsel
in order to resolve the case more expeditiously.76 A judge, for example,
might tell a defendant that the court will not impose jail time if the
defendant waives the right to an attorney and pleads guilty on the spot.77
Further, defendants who qualify for appointed counsel may choose to
represent themselves if they are competent to do so.78 The choice, upon
closer inspection, often seems less than voluntary.79 Although the waiver
of the right to counsel must be intelligent and voluntary, some defendants
may erroneously waive their right.80 The court is not obliged to inform the
defendant of all of the possible advantages of counsel (except on the eve
of trial in some cases).81 Although national standards recommend that
judges clearly inform defendants of their right to counsel,82 and not simply
assume that a willingness to proceed without a lawyer signals a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver,83 many observers have noted courts
routinely accepting guilty pleas from uncounseled defendants in the
absence of a clear waiver of the right to counsel.84
misdemeanor cases); Hashimoto, supra note 6, at 1022–25 (discussing state practice of failing to
appoint constitutionally required counsel in misdemeanor cases).
75. BACH, supra note 23, at 103–04. In one case, a defendant pleaded guilty before her lawyer
arrived at court, although this clearly violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The
judge later admitted this was “absolute error.” Id.
76. Id. at 126 (recounting a case in which judge said to the defendant, “You can get a lawyer . . . if
you wish to . . . . On the other hand, if you were to admit to [the crime], which I’m not suggesting you
do at this stage and you are not obligated to do at any stage, but if you pled guilty, I would impose a
fine [only]”).
77. Id.
78. The right to self-representation in federal criminal prosecutions is codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1654
(“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or
by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein.”), and, in state criminal prosecutions, as a constitutional right under the Fourteenth and
Sixth Amendments, see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). The colloquy to establish if
waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary does not, however, require a full colloquy from the court
on the advantages of counsel except on the eve of trial in some cases. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77,
87 (2004).
79. See, e.g., Hashimoto, supra note 6, at 1033 (reporting study that found that 60% of defendants
were not informed of the benefits of representation before waiving their right to counsel).
80. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
81. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 87.
82. See ABA, PROVIDING DEF. SERVS., supra note 73, § 5-8.1; ABA, DEF. FUNCTION, supra note
73, §§ 4-2.1, 4-2.2, 4-2.3; GUIDELINES, supra note 73, §§ 1.2, 1.3, 1.4; NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N,
supra note 73, § 13.3.
83. ABA, PROVIDING DEF. SERVS., supra note 73, § 5-8.2(a).
84. In 2004, the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Defense heard testimony about a
practice in a Georgia county in which defendants were given a complicated form that included an
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Still other defendants proceed without a lawyer because they do not
qualify for appointed counsel but cannot afford the rates charged by
private attorneys.85 The threshold for qualifying financially for a public
defender varies dramatically by state and often by courthouse or judge.
The ABA reported that nonuniform and budget-driven determinations of
indigency result in failure to appoint counsel to people unable to afford
attorneys in some jurisdictions.86 Even if they qualify for appointed
counsel, defendants may be charged a fee.87 Studies demonstrate that the
fee discourages defendants from requesting appointed counsel, especially
when no information is provided about how to obtain a fee waiver or when
the information provided about fee waivers is confusing.88 A 2011 Florida
study documented that defendants entering the court for arraignment were
provided with a written notice stating that the fee for a public defender
would be $50 for defendants who plead guilty at arraignment, and $350
for defendants who plead not guilty and request a trial date.89 No doubt
such a notice will discourage both requests for appointed counsel and
pleas of not guilty.
Considering the math, it is understandable that a person charged with a
crime might seek to resolve their case on their own rather than accrue fees.
Assuming that the defendant pays a $50 fee and pleads guilty at
arraignment after a two-minute consultation with the public defender, that
defendant has essentially paid the public defender more than $20 per
minute—a rate of $1,200 per hour—for their legal services.90 Contesting
the charges and asserting one’s right to a trial triggers $300 in additional
fees and the added expense and inconvenience of returning to court. It is
no wonder that a defendant faced with this menu of fees might choose to
waive the right to counsel.
The cumulative effect of the constitutional and statutory limits on the

admission of guilty, guilty plea colloquy, and waiver of right to counsel, and told that their case would
not be called until they signed the “form.” ABA SCLAID, supra note 56, at 25.
85. See BACH, supra note 23, at 106 (recounting examples of a judge intentionally pushing
defendants to retain counsel “as opposed to saddling the county with the expense” of appointed
counsel to which the defendants were entitled).
86. ABA SCLAID, supra note 56, at 12.
87. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-499.09 (2020) (indicating that the court may order the
defendant to pay a $25 fee); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 6.4 (indicating that the counsel fee may be waived
upon showing of substantial hardship). Illinois permits courts to charge defendants up to $500 for a
misdemeanor and $5,000 for a felony. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/113.-3.1 (2021).
88. See ABA SCLAID, supra note 56, at 13 (discussing fee for appointed counsel services in
various states and counties, noting instances in which defendants unable to pay are put on onerous
payment plans or jailed for failure to pay for their court appointed counsel).
89. SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 31, at 18.
90. Id.
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right to counsel, combined with practical failures and financial
disincentives, result in millions of defendants representing themselves in
the lower courts every year.91 In some states, over half of defendants in
misdemeanor cases represent themselves or proceed with inadequate
representation.92
The high levels of unrepresented defendants have been a constant since
at least the 1970s. In his 1979 study of New Haven’s lower courts,
Malcolm Feeley found that 40% of defendants did not have an attorney.93
Court officials underestimated how many defendants were
self-represented, Feeley thought, because they were “invisible, often
slipping through the court quietly by pleading guilty at first appearance or
failing to appear altogether.”94 Sub-carceral and also often subaudible,
these defendants constitute at least three-quarters of the people targeted
for prosecution in the U.S.95
B.

What’s My Line: Defendants Speaking in Court

What follows is a road map of the typical criminal case resolved
through a guilty plea.96 Moments when the defendant either has the
opportunity or the obligation to speak are noted. Crucially, this section
demonstrates that even defendants who are represented by counsel are
often in a position to speak directly to the court because their attorney is
either not present or the hearing requires the defendant to speak.
1.

First Appearance, Pretrial Release and Bail Hearing, and
Arraignment
The law is unsettled regarding whether the defendant has the right to

91. Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 13, at 975 (estimating approximately thirteen million
misdemeanor cases filed per year).
92. ABA SCLAID, supra note 56, at 26 (providing testimony from Washington, New Mexico, and
California). The latest (although dated) Bureau of Justice Statistics report states that approximately
one-third of people charged with misdemeanors proceed without a lawyer. CAROLINE WOLF
HARLOW, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 179023, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 3, 5 (2000),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND2K-MPC5] (noting that 38.4% of
federal misdemeanants and approximately one-third of defendants in the largest seventy-five counties
in the country represented themselves).
93. FEELEY, supra note 36, at 181–82.
94. Id. at 182.
95. Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 13, at 975.
96. Ninety to ninety-five percent of all criminal cases resolve through plea bargaining. LINDSEY
DEVERS, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST , RESEARCH SUMMARY: PLEA AND
CHARGE BARGAINING 3 (2011), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/document/
PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K57-GK8X].
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have counsel present during the defendant’s first appearance. The
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is said to “attach[]” at the defendant’s
first appearance before a neutral magistrate when probable cause is
determined.97 Somewhat counterintuitively, the right to have counsel
appear on one’s behalf is not coextensive with the right to counsel
attaching. Defendants only have the right to have counsel present on their
behalf during what the Supreme Court calls “‘critical’ stages” of the
proceedings.98 Critical stages are defined as any proceeding in which lack
of representation “would impair defense on the merits if the accused is
required to proceed without counsel”99 and where counsel can “help avoid
that prejudice.”100 There remain unanswered questions about whether the
defendant’s first appearance is a critical stage, triggering the right to the
appearance of counsel. In Rothgery v. Gillespie County,101 the U.S.
Supreme Court stopped short of finding that the defendant’s appearance
at a probable cause hearing is a critical stage, even though the right to
counsel attaches at first appearance.102 As a result, defendants in many
jurisdictions may be unrepresented during their first appearance in court.
Pretrial release decisions are often made during the defendant’s initial
appearance or at arraignment. Although a hearing to decide whether to
incarcerate someone pretrial intuitively seems to be a critical stage—
triggering the appointment of counsel—the Supreme Court has no holding
squarely on point.103 As a result, although state laws and practices vary,
defendants often represent themselves at the very important moment when
the court decides whether they can go home and continue to live their lives
before the case is adjudicated. Presenting evidence that the defendant is
stable and law-abiding is crucial to ensuring pretrial liberty.
While laws and practices vary, most release decisions are made
considering a plethora of factors about the defendant’s prior criminal

97. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 212–13 (2008). A neutral magistrate then must
decide whether the documents filed by the police or the prosecutor’s office establish, on their face,
probable cause to believe that the crime was committed, and that the person charged committed the
crime. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120–22 (1975). Probable cause can be determined by a
grand jury, although the use of grand juries has decreased over time. See Suja A. Thomas, The Missing
Branch of the Jury, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1261, 1270 (2016).
98. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (first citing United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218, 227–28 (1967); and then citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
99. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122 (first citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); and then citing
Wade, 388 U.S. at 226–27).
100. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9 (quoting Wade, 388 U.S. at 227).
101. 554 U.S. 191 (2008).
102. Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 212–13 & n.17.
103. See Charlie Gerstein, Note, Plea Bargaining and the Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1513 (2013).
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record and the stability of the defendant’s ties to the community. So, for
example, whether the defendant is a flight risk depends in part on whether
the defendant has a home, a job, and a family.104 The defendant’s prior
record may also contain information about whether the defendant is a
flight risk or a danger to the community.105 In these inquiries, the
defendant may have relevant, important information to share with the
court that could be weighed in the decision whether the defendant should
be released. Moreover, in jurisdictions in which the court orders
defendants to pay a financial bond or bail, defendants can speak about
their ability to pay and request a bail that will not result in wealth-based
detention.106
Even if defendants have attorneys at their bail hearings, they may not
have had time to consult with their new lawyers before the hearing. As a
result, the court may—again, depending on the jurisdiction—inquire
directly of defendants whether they have a home and employment as well
as the reasons for any prior failures to appear in court.107 Or, put
differently, one can imagine that a defendant who felt empowered to speak
might pipe up to offer important information that the court or the defense
attorney did not know.108
At the arraignment, the formal charges are read, and the defendant is
required to enter a plea of guilty or not guilty to the charges. Because
arraignment is a critical stage, the defendant who is otherwise entitled to
appointed counsel has the right to have counsel present.109 Remember,
however, that the right to have counsel appear on one’s behalf at
arraignment is subject to the important circumscription described
above.110 Misdemeanor defendants often are not entitled to

104. See, e.g., MD. R. 4-216.1(f)(2)(C) (indicating that the release decision must consider multiple
factors including, inter alia, “the defendant’s family ties, employment status and history,
financial resources”).
105. Id. 4-216.1(f)(2)(B).
106. See, e.g., id. 4-216.1(e)(1) (indicating that the judge must consider defendant’s ability to pay
before setting a financial condition).
107. An inquiry into the defendant’s work, living arrangements, and ties to the community is
relevant to determining whether the defendant poses a risk of flight. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran
Baughman, Dividing Bail Reform, 105 IOWA L. REV. 947, 985–86 (2020) (discussing factors deemed
relevant to the risk of flight in various state pretrial release regimes). It follows that the defendant
must answer directly if the defendant is unrepresented or if defense counsel does not know the answers
to the court’s questions.
108. A related argument can be made that defendants who refuse to answer the judge’s questions
about their criminal, work, and personal history may be punished with high bail and detention. BACH,
supra note 23, at 106–07 (describing how a judge held a defendant on an unaffordable bail until he
agreed to provide satisfactory answers to questions about his work, school, age, and probation status).
109. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (identifying arraignment as a critical stage).
110. See supra section I.A.
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court-appointed counsel despite their indigency if the prosecutor is not
seeking incarceration upon conviction.111 Also, as discussed above, some
courts may fail to provide constitutionally mandated counsel at this phase.
Arraignment hearings are particularly critical in a world in which plea
bargaining is the norm and trials the exception.112 Many defendants—
especially in misdemeanor cases—enter a plea of guilty at arraignment. A
2011 Florida study, for example, documented that 70% of defendants,
often unrepresented by counsel, pleaded guilty at arraignment.113
2.

Plea Bargaining and Sentencing Hearings

Whether at the arraignment or at a subsequent court date, defendants
will almost invariably be presented with a plea offer that they will accept,
even if they have no say in its terms and no idea what to say.114 Because
plea offers usually come before any meaningful discovery or litigation of
legal issues, defendants must decide whether to accept an offer without
ever having told anyone their side of the story.
In some courts, unrepresented defendants must negotiate directly with
prosecutors or be informed of the prosecutor’s offer from the judge and
then be asked—in open court—if they accept it.115 Feeley, for example,
describes defendants lined up to discuss possible plea deals with the
prosecutor.116 He notes that the prosecutors could be “aggressive and
blunt” with self-represented defendants,117 and that “only particularly
enterprising defendants argue with a prosecutor.”118 In another,
contrasting example, he heard a prosecutor tell an unrepresented
defendant, “Don’t fuck around. Take a small fine. Why come back again
111. Id.
112. See DEVERS, supra note 96, at 3 (noting that 90–95% of all criminal cases resolve through
plea bargaining); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012) (noting the right to effective assistance
of counsel in plea bargaining).
113. SMITH & MADDAN, supra note 31, at 15. Defendants who pleaded guilty at arraignment were
three times as likely not to be represented by counsel. Id. at 18 (“These findings raise significant
concerns that unrepresented defendants, particularly those not subject to pre-arraignment custody,
underestimate the non-immediate yet serious and long-term consequences of misdemeanor
convictions.”).
114. Roberts, supra note 33, at 174; Hashimoto, supra note 6, at 1032–34.
115. A report on the right to counsel in Texas documents prosecutors speaking directly to
defendants in a manner that encourages defendants to resolve their cases without counsel. ANDREA
MARSH & SUSANNE PRINGLE, TEX. FAIR DEF. PROJECT, THE WAY FORWARD: RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR IMPROVING INDIGENT DEFENSE IN TEXAS ON THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF GIDEON V.
WAINRIGHT 16 (2013), https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/liman/document/the-wayforward.pdf [https://perma.cc/RUZ3-XX8C].
116. FEELEY, supra note 36, at 183.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 184.
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or perhaps two or three times?”119 The prosecutor then asked the
defendant if he had any money, and the defendant simply nodded.120
While these exchanges did not occur in open court, they raise the same
concern as exchanges between judges and defendants.
The self-represented defendant who is offered a plea deal may want to
discuss the allegations in the case, which will result in the court explaining
that the only appropriate time to contest the allegations is at trial. The time
to talk about the case never arrives.121 This stands in some contrast to civil
practice, in which robust discovery and motions practice may provide a
context in which both sides can articulate their perspective.122 In criminal
court, most cases are resolved without the defendants ever expressing
what they wanted to say about their cases.123
Moreover, even represented defendants may not have discussed the
facts of the case with their lawyers prior to accepting a plea offer. In some
courthouses, court-appointed counsel simply repeat the prosecution’s plea
offer to their clients without conducting a longer legal consultation.124 For
example, a 2004 ABA report described the practice in a county in
Louisiana where “the public defender will introduce himself to his client,
tell him the ‘deal’ that has been negotiated, and ask him to ‘sign here.’”125
The pressure to accept the plea offer quickly and without debate is
pronounced for defendants who are arrested and held in custody until their
arraignment. Frequently, misdemeanor defendants who have been held on
bail are offered a plea deal at arraignment in which they will receive a
sentence of “time served” and be immediately released from jail provided
they plead guilty.126 The promise of immediate release encourages

119. Id. at 183.
120. Id.
121. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1464–66.
122. See, e.g., Ion Meyn, Constructing Separate and Unequal Courtrooms, 63 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 23–
26 (2021) (comparing the advantages of civil litigants to the limited rule-based rights of criminal
defendants).
123. If a defendant attempts to speak about the facts of the case during a pretrial hearing, the judge
will invariably tell him to be silent so as not to incriminate himself. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1458,
1464–66. When defense attorneys discuss plea offers directly with prosecutors, they may engage in a
back-and-forth over the facts and the charges. Id. at 1462. This occurs off the record and usually
without the defendant. Id.
124. In one interaction between an attorney and client, the short time that the defendant had to
accept the plea was spent in a dispute between the attorney and client about whether the attorney had
ever spoken to the client before. See BACH, supra note 23, at 17.
125. ABA SCLAID, supra note 56, at 16. In response to seeing the same kind of “processing”—as
opposed to lawyering—in Atlanta, Georgia, esteemed death penalty lawyer Stephen Bright remarked,
“This is obviously not legal representation. This is processing. High school students could do this.” Id.
126. ALEC KARAKATSANIS, USUAL CRUELTY: THE COMPLICITY OF LAWYERS IN THE CRIMINAL
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defendants to quickly enter a plea of guilty without further debate.127
If the defendant accepts the plea offer, the defendant’s required speech
to the court is entirely scripted and indeed must not contain objections to
issues that would otherwise be litigated, like the police conduct at arrest
or the facts of the case.128 Instead, the defendant follows a script. Guilty
plea colloquies follow a script in which defendants must be asked in open
court whether they understand the rights that they are waiving, including
the right to a jury trial, the right against self-incrimination, the right to call
witnesses, the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and the right to
hold the government to the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.129 The judge generally asks, “Do you understand that you are
waiving the right to . . . ” and the defendant answers, “Yes.” Any
deviation from the script may cause the plea to fail.130 One defendant, for
example, was asked by the judge whether a certain punishment was
acceptable in exchange for his guilty plea.131 When the defendant said in
response, “Acceptable,” the court said, “Excuse me? . . . How do you
plead to the charges?”132 So scripted is the interaction that the defendant
should not pick up on the judge’s cues and language, but know to simply
say, “Guilty.” And, of course, refusing to admit that the facts are sufficient
for a jury to find the defendant guilty at trial would cause the plea to fail.
The scripted nature of the plea colloquy renders it useless as an
opportunity for defendants to challenge the proceedings or the
government’s narrative of the case. Amy Bach, a journalist who spent
eight years researching U.S. criminal courts, reported a plea colloquy in
which the defendant said, “Yes, ma’am” to each question the judge asked
during the plea colloquy even though the terms of the plea the judge
recited were different (worse) than those she had agreed to with the

INJUSTICE SYSTEM 157 (2019). In three states, Alec Karakatsanis witnessed “hundreds of defendants
in minor misdemeanor cases plead guilty without a lawyer just so that they could finally get out of
jail after weeks in a cage because they were too poor to pay for their release pending trial.” Id.
127. See, e.g., MARSH & PRINGLE, supra note 115, at 15 (describing Texas counties in which
defendants are encouraged to plead guilty to secure immediate release). Arguably, when a defendant
held in custody pleads guilty to “time served,” they are already serving a carceral sentence and should
thus be entitled to a lawyer. While such a plea deal should theoretically trigger the right to appointed
counsel, no Supreme Court holding is directly on point, and many defendants plead guilty under such
conditions with no attorney advising them.
128. See GRUBER, supra note 22, at 155.
129. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(B)–(F) (listing the rights the trial judge must inform the
defendant of in order to accept a plea of guilty).
130. See Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1463–64.
131. BACH, supra note 23, at 108.
132. Id.
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prosecutor.133 The defendant—like many, I am sure—was simply
adhering to the script even when the deal agreed to was different than the
sentence being put on the record during the plea colloquy.
Sentencing hearings occur after plea bargains are struck as well as after
trials resulting in a guilty verdict. The judge imposes the sentence either
after a plea negotiation or after a finding of guilt at trial.134 While, in some
jurisdictions, judges are bound by the sentence agreed upon by the
prosecutor and the defendant (which the judge must either accept or reject
but not deviate from), in other jurisdictions, judges make the final decision
about the sentence, treating the plea agreement’s sentence as a
recommendation only.135
Before the judge makes a sentencing decision, the judge may engage in
a direct inquiry of the defendant about factors relevant to sentencing.
Sentencing is traditionally a time when defendants in all criminal cases—
even those represented by counsel—may speak directly to the court.
Federal criminal procedure, for example, provides defendants with a rulebased right to speak at sentencing, called the right to allocution.136
Interestingly, while the defendants allocute without a script like the one
during the plea colloquy, defendant statements at sentencing seem
scripted because their comments are so narrow in range. In her study of
defendants’ allocutions—all of whom were represented by counsel—M.
Catherine Gruber found that defendants usually apologize, take
responsibility for the crime, assess their own conduct, and acknowledge
the harm they caused.137 The sentencing court seems to expect—and even
demand—a certain type of speech from defendants about responsibility
and remorse.138
Apart from the most serious felonies, cases in state and local courts
rarely reserve the time or carry the same gravitas as the federal sentencing
hearings that Gruber observed. But a second type of defendant allocution

133. Id. at 19. The defendant’s lawyer was not in the courtroom at the time and had asked another
attorney unfamiliar with the case to stand in for him. Id.
134. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(4)–(5) (indicating that the judge may accept or reject plea
agreement); MD. R. 4-243(b)–(c)(3) (indicating that the court shall inform the parties that it is not
bound by the plea agreement).
135. Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining Managerial
Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 373–75 (2016) (describing
binding and nonbinding plea agreements).
136. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304–05 (1961) (holding that defendants have a
rule-based right to speak at sentencing); cf. Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 424–29 (1962)
(holding that denial of opportunity to allocute at sentencing did not amount to a
constitutional violation).
137. GRUBER, supra note 22, at 46–64.
138. Hanan, supra note 22, at 319.
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that she described—offering mitigating evidence and arguments—applies
to state court sentencing hearings.139 Because sentencing decisions are
often discretionary, speaking up about feasibility and fairness of the
punishment could be effective.140 Judges are free to choose from a range
of sanctions.141 While courts have rules and formal structure, much of
what happens depends on what Malcolm Feeley refers to as “folkways”
or “informal ‘rules of the game.’”142 Interpersonal exchanges matter, and
one can see examples of “cooperation, exchange, and adaptation.”143 Even
if the jurisdiction employs sentencing guidelines, the court may deviate
from the guidelines based on its assessment of the defendant and
the case.144
Although sub-carceral sanctions may be less concerning than
imprisonment, their impact can be devastating. The burdens of these
sub-carceral sanctions fall disproportionately on communities that are
aggressively policed—usually low-income Black and Latinx
communities.145 Theresa Zhen describes the impact of fines and fees in
relation to class and race:
[M]any individuals expend time, energy, and money to resolve
prior court debts in ways that middle class white people do not
(by virtue of their economic and racial privilege)—trying to keep
up with extended payment plans, performing countless hours of
“community service,” enduring the harassing collections attempts
by private collections agencies, forfeiting their driving privileges,
and navigating multiple agencies to reinstate their
139. Gruber found that defendants in federal court also often stated whether they agreed with the
sentence and offered the court reasons why their sentences should be less based on personal and
familial factors, but that these comments seemed unwelcome in the court. GRUBER, supra note 22, at
103 (summarizing the types of mitigation arguments that defendants make during their
sentencing allocutions).
140. Roberts, supra note 33, at 175, 190 (“[J]udges have enormous discretion in misdemeanor
sentencing, guided only by the statutory maximum in most jurisdictions.”).
141. DUDA-BANWAR & BURT, supra note 30, at 16–19.
142. FEELEY, supra note 36, at 57–58. Feeley also describes the court as an “open system, exposed
to continuing and not always predictable influences from its environment.” Id. at 19 (emphasis
in original).
143. Id. at 57; see also id. at 16 (noting that while in many ways, lower courts may seem to function
like a bureaucracy, they are not really bureaucracies because they are not closed systems with “clear
agreement on organizational goals”).
144. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313–14 (2004) (holding that mandatory
sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional in state prosecutions); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220, 259 (2005) (holding that federal and state judges have discretion to depart from sentencing
guideline recommendations).
145. Mayson & Stevenson, supra note 13, at 1020 (“[M]isdemeanor enforcement
disproportionately targets the poor and the disenfranchised, and especially poor people of color.”);
see also id. at 979.
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driver’s licenses.146
Other sub-carceral sanctions can create insurmountable burdens on the
defendant’s limited resources. Repeat trips to the courthouse, monitoring
sites, classes, and community service can pose transportation, childcare,
employment, and health challenges.147 Even before sanctions are imposed,
the defendant is burdened by the misdemeanor court process. In his
seminal book, The Process is the Punishment, Malcolm Feeley argued that
being required to come to court, to wait for one’s case to be heard, and to
otherwise comply with the court’s procedural orders all amount to a kind
of punishment.148 As a result, one is punished before the formal
punishment begins.
Information about the defendant’s financial well-being or work and
family obligations may result in a different sentencing decision, one that
is more tailored to the defendant’s circumstances.149 Although the cases
move quickly, the lower court judge is focused on whether and how much
to monitor, sanction, or attempt to rehabilitate the misdemeanor defendant
through an “alphabet soup” of programs.150 In such a context, a relatively
quick presentation of the reasons why fines, fees, and programs are not
appropriate or feasible for the defendant is possible. Although some
jurisdictions set flat fees for certain offenses, others permit fees to be
graduated based on the defendant’s ability to pay.151 Unlike contesting
146. Theresa Zhen, (Color)Blind Reform How Ability-to-Pay Determinations Are Inadequate to
Transform a Racialized System of Penal Debt, 43 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 175, 199 (2019)
(“[T]raffic courtrooms teem with minority people who cannot afford to pay their tickets, or who are
slapped with a failure to appear or pay.”). If a defendant is found to not have the ability to pay the
fine, the United States Supreme Court has opined that the court may impose modified sanctions, such
as extended payment plans, reduction of the amount of the fine, and conversion of the fine into hours
of public service. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983).
147. See Zhen, supra note 146, at 188, 213–14. These hardships placed on defendants are what Issa
Kohler-Hausmann calls “procedural hassle.” KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 13, at 183.
148. FEELEY, supra note 36, at 199–243 (identifying the pretrial burdens as something experienced
as a punishment).
149. Kohler-Hausmann elaborates on Feeley’s observations, generating a new insight: lower court
judges assess multiple aspects of the case and the misdemeanor defendant in order to decide on the
level of monitoring and type of rehabilitative intervention. Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Managerial
Justice and Mass Misdemeanors, 66 STAN. L. REV. 611, 624 (2014).
150. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 13, at 241.
151. See generally SHARON BRETT & MITALI NAGRECHA, CRIM. JUST. POL’Y PROGRAM,
HARVARD L. SCH., PROPORTIONATE FINANCIAL SANCTIONS: POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS FOR JUDICIAL
REFORM (2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers cfm?abstract_id=3759204 [https://perma.cc/LZ
J7-32VE] (arguing for policy changes to the imposition of monetary sanctions, including graduated
fines and fees); Beth A. Colgan, Graduating Economic Sanctions According to Ability to Pay, 103
IOWA L. REV. 53 (2017) (discussing implementation of graduated fines and fees). Depending on the
state or county, inquiries into the defendant’s ability to pay can be so detailed and comprehensive that
they have been accused of invasiveness. Zhen, supra note 146, at 202 (noting that Alabama’s ability
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guilt, which triggers delays and multiple trips to the courthouse,152 arguing
that the defendant should not be incarcerated, cannot pay a fine, or
deserves to be given the opportunity to complete a drug treatment program
can be argued and resolved during the sentencing hearing.
In many busy courtrooms, defendants would fare better than their
lawyers in pushing for reduced sub-carceral sanctions. When attorneys do
not have time to interview their clients, it increases the chances that the
client, not the attorney, will have relevant information to share with the
court. Bach recounts instances in which no one in the courtroom could tell
whether the defense counsel on duty in a courtroom was representing
specific defendants, so disengaged was the attorney from the individual
cases.153 Furthermore, even diligent defense attorneys might be so
overburdened that they do not have time to listen to, digest, and recount
their clients’ stories to the court. 154 This phenomenon increases the chance
that the judge will turn directly to the defendant with questions about the
proposed sentence. In these instances, whether a defendant has a car, a
job, a cell phone, or the ability to pay a fine may be information that an
attorney simply does not know. It is no wonder, then, that judges—
especially conscientious judges—turn directly to defendants to ask
whether they can pay the fine or arrange transportation to a class or
community service.
Yet, defendants in the lower court may seem speechless at sentencing.
Jenny Roberts describes a case in which a defendant who did not qualify
for a public defender remained silent during the sentencing hearing, “not
sure what he should add.”155 In the unscripted moments of a sentencing
hearing, it is exceedingly difficult for defendants to speak up to the
authority of the court and say that the fine, fee, program, or other sanction
is not feasible or fair.156

to pay inquiry includes anything owned, including jewelry, and Connecticut’s inquiry is a form over
six pages long).
152. Kohler-Hausmann recounts a misdemeanor trial for a young man accused of jumping a
turnstile. Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 149, at 665–66. He made fourteen court appearances before
the trial date, where he was found not guilty. Id.
153. BACH, supra note 23, at 94–95, 103–05. In two anecdotes recounted, the defendant was
permitted to plead guilty by the judge because the judge assumed the duty attorney was representing
the defendant. Id. Apparently, the attorney’s lack of verbal advocacy and lack of physical presence
by the defendant’s side during the hearing was not unusual in instances in which he was the attorney
of record. Id. In the case recounted, he was not the defendant’s lawyer. Id.
154. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1451.
155. Roberts, supra note 33, at 174.
156. See infra Part II.
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Status Hearings and Violation Hearings

After sentencing, many defendants will be required to return to court
for status dates to determine whether they have completed the
requirements of the sub-carceral sanctions.157 Defendants often represent
themselves during status hearings, even if they were appointed counsel
for adjudication and sentencing.158 So, for example, when a defendant
returns to court to report whether they have paid fees, attended mandatory
programs, or passed a drug test, counsel is often not present. The
defendant offers proof of compliance and explains any failures directly to
the court. For defendants who must report on a multitude of sub-carceral
tasks, like fines, classes, drug testing, and so forth, post-sentencing status
hearings can be the longest exchanges between the court and the
defendant.159 Aspects of the original sentence may be revealed to be unfair
or unworkable, such as a requirement to attend a class not accessible by
public transportation for a defendant with no car.
More importantly, it is usually within the judge’s discretion how to
respond to a failure, whether to incarcerate, extend the time for
compliance, impose more sanctions, or to simply dismiss the case. 160
Short of incarceration, the court may impose additional conditions and
monetary sanctions for failure to comply with the initial terms of the
sentence even without counsel present.161 Judges have the discretion to
issue a bench warrant for the defendant who does not appear, and to take
any number of actions with regard to the original sentence, including
granting the defendant more time to complete its requirements or to

157. Status hearings often are discussed within the context of problem-solving courts. See, e.g.,
JAMES L. NOLAN, JR., LEGAL ACCENTS, LEGAL BORROWING: THE INTERNATIONAL
PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT MOVEMENT 18 (2009) (describing direct and personal engagement
between a judge and defendant on multiple status dates).
158. The defendant usually has the right to counsel for hearings on the revocation of probation and
imposition of a sentence of incarceration. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787–88 (1973). The
right to counsel does not extend to other types of status hearings in which the defendant is appearing
before the court after adjudication. See id. at 788 (declining to find a bright-line rule that defendants
have the right to counsel in all probation revocation proceedings). In the context of problem-solving
courts that typically require defendants to appear for numerous status hearings, defense counsel may
be absent. See, e.g., Quinn, supra note 20, at 63–65 (noting that appointed counsel is often not present
for status dates).
159. This assertion is based on my observations as a public defender in Massachusetts as well as
my observations while directing a misdemeanor defense clinic in Nevada.
160. See infra Part II.
161. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 42–
43, 58 (2015) [hereinafter FERGUSON REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/lega
cy/2015/03/04/ferguson_ findings_3-4-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/34C7-XTSD] (discussing failure to
appear fees and other add-on sanctions imposed on defendants who did not comply with the court’s
initial orders).
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impose jail time on a defendant who fails to fulfill the requirements.162
An important issue should be noted at this point. Even though a
defendant was not initially facing jail time, and thus not appointed a
lawyer for arraignment, plea negotiations, and sentencing, the defendant
may be facing jail time if they fail to comply with sub-carceral
sanctions.163 At this point, the defendant most likely has the right to an
attorney,164 but the factual question of guilt and the terms of sentence have
already been settled long before receiving legal assistance.
As the above account of criminal trial practice makes clear, at
numerous points in the process, defendants could—at least in theory—
provide information and perspectives that would challenge the court’s
decisions and process. They could challenge pretrial detention, the
amount of bail, the sanctions the court contemplates imposing, and the
consequences the court considers following a failure to meet those
conditions. But, instead, their speech occurs in scripted ways that do not
provide an opportunity to say anything at all.
Of course, simple reasons play a part in explaining why defendants do
not say much when called before the court. In some instances, defendants
are physically unable to speak because they are absent from the courtroom
or otherwise cannot be heard.165 Defendants with counsel are often
cautioned by their attorneys to be quiet out of fear of self-incrimination.166
162. DUDA-BANWAR & BURT, supra note 30, at 16–17.
163. Although a person cannot be incarcerated for a non-willful failure to pay pursuant to Bearden
v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 674 (1983), in practice, many people experience fee and fine related
incarceration. This occurs when a jurisdiction ignores Bearden. See, e.g., FERGUSON REPORT, supra
note 161, at 48–49 (describing judge incarcerating without an ability-to-pay hearing for defendants
who appeared for their compliance date but who had failed to pay fines). It also occurs when a judge
finds the failure to pay willful. See, e.g., Zhen, supra note 146, at 207–08 (discussing instances of
racialized distrust of Black defendants’ inability-to-pay claims). And, finally, it occurs when a
defendant fails to appear in court on a compliance date because the defendant does not have the money
that they owe the court. See, e.g., DUDA-BANWAR & BURT, supra note 30, at 7 (describing the bench
warrant process in Monroe County, New York). In the latter case, a bench warrant may be issued. Id.
164. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (holding that the court must appoint a lawyer
before a hearing to determine whether suspended sentence should be imposed); see also Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 791 (1973) (holding that a due process right to counsel can be triggered in
probation violation cases when the defendant could be incarcerated based on the violation).
165. They have not been brought into the courtroom from lockup and their hearing (erroneously)
proceeded without them. BACH, supra note 23, at 100 (describing the entry of a plea of guilty to “time
served” without the defendant being brought into the courtroom). Or, the courtroom may be designed
to prevent defendants from speaking. In some courtrooms in Massachusetts, for example, defendants
sit in a plastic box in the courtroom from which they can neither hear, nor be heard. KARAKATSANIS,
supra note 126, at 101 (describing courtrooms in Roxbury, Massachusetts).
166. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1471 (discussing “troublesome client stories” (quoting John B.
Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered Representation What Is a True Believer to Do When His
Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 85, 103 (1999) (arguing that the right against
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Moreover, defendants may have a realistic fear that engaging in any
behavior that delays or challenges the proceedings may result in
punishment.167 Stage fright that strikes new lawyers will apply with
greater force to most defendants.168 Furthermore, defendants do not know
what type of advocacy is possible, a problem exacerbated by courtrooms
in which the defense attorneys themselves do not appear to advocate
zealously and thereby do not set a good example for the pro se
defendant.169 Making speech more difficult is the pace at which
misdemeanor cases are heard. With less than three minutes dedicated to
each hearing, “it is unlikely that [defendants’ questions] will be answered
because the prosecutor and defense attorney have already turned their
attention to the next case.”170
Looking deeper, however, yields insights into other, less obvious
reasons for the absence of defendants’ speech in court. The defendant’s
inability to talk back is not due solely to the defendant’s lack of expertise
or to the pace of court proceedings. Rather, silence in court is enforced
through diffuse systems of power. In the next Part, I address how multiple
forms of power prevent defendants from talking back.
II.

VIOLENCE, ORDER, AND TENDERNESS

In this Part, I consider three types of power that are at work to silence
defendants’ speech: sovereign, disciplinary, and social-emotional. How
the silencing happens, I argue, is not so much through conscious decisions
(although courts may explicitly and consciously silence some defendants)
but through the working of different kinds of power. Although the state’s
power to arrest and punish looms large, other types of power also
silence defendants.
In particular, the disciplinary power—originally described by Michel
Foucault—coaxes people into a state of compliance without explicit
threats of punishment.171 The jumping-off point for my argument about
the impact of disciplinary power on defendants’ ability to speak in court
is the work of Kohler-Hausmann, who persuasively argues that
misdemeanor courts are in the business of judging whether defendants
self-incrimination and the right to have counsel speak on one’s behalf are twin instruments designed
to protect defendants from conviction and punishment))).
167. See infra Part II.
168. See generally Hanan, supra note 22 (discussing the inhibiting effects of courtroom formality
in relation to defendant’s allocution at sentencing).
169. KARAKATSANIS, supra note 126, at 102 (identifying “one of the great, silent fears of public
defenders: that the judge would be upset by her request and would not be as lenient”).
170. FEELEY, supra note 36, at 156.
171. See FOUCAULT, supra note 50, at 135–38.
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demonstrate orderliness.172 Kohler-Hausmann, however, does not
scrutinize the defendant’s speech in court and how the disciplinary
measures affect speech.173 I argue that, given the lower court’s focus on
orderliness, any form of talking back in court—meaning speaking to
authorities as equals—risks seeming disorderly. To be perceived as
disorderly is to risk becoming the target of further punishment, sanctions,
and monitoring.
Critically, this disciplinary power is compounded by social-emotional
power in the courtroom. Rather than express their needs and contest the
unfairness of the disposition, which risks appearing disruptive and
disorderly, defendants perform mildness, agreeability, and order by
following the court’s scripts or keeping silent. Indeed, defendants may
“over-correct” out of concern that, through implicit biases, any
disagreement on their part will be perceived as belligerent or
noncooperative. The demand for mildness and agreeability may be
invisible in courtrooms that emphasize informality and therapeutic aid for
defendants. As Mae Quinn and other scholars of specialty courts argue,
the court’s focus on treatment and expressions of praise for defendants
who comply with treatment further enforces the emotional norm of
cooperation over contestation.174
Importantly, all three types of power work together. Sovereign
power—the power of violence—is a primary driver of compliance. The
legitimate fear of the sovereign’s power to punish surely leads defendants
to conform to the disciplinary and social-emotional cues of the courtroom.
But I wish to make another argument: Disciplinary and social-emotional
power have free-standing influence on behavior, even without the threat
of punishment. We follow rules and adopt emotional tones appropriate to
172. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 13, at 61 (arguing that misdemeanor courts “sort and
regulate people over time”).
173. Kohler-Hausmann mentions that the defendant’s performance of orderliness includes
following courtroom norms like sitting quietly to wait for one’s case to be called. Id. at 216–17
(characterizing sitting and waiting as part of the defendant’s disciplinary training). It is possible that
defendants speak less in the courts that she studied than they do in other courts. Her research was
conducted in New York, a state that grants the right to counsel for all persons charged with crimes
regardless of the potential penalty. See Stream v. Beisheim, 311 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546 (App. Div. 1970);
People v. Witenski, 207 N.E.2d 358, 361–62 (N.Y. 1965). Yet, at least in some counties in New York,
variations in eligibility requirements for appointed counsel led to a lawsuit and subsequent consent
decree. N.Y. STATE OFF. OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVS., CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR
DETERMINING ASSIGNED COUNSEL ELIGIBILITY 2–10 (2016), https://www.ils.ny.gov/sites/ils.ny.go
v/files/Eligibility%20Criteria%20and%20Procedures%20FINAL%20FULL%20April%204%20201
6.pdf [https://perma.cc/D85V-D84W].
174. Quinn, supra note 20, at 49. Eric Miller argues that drug courts are designed to de-emphasize
the power to say “no” to government intrusion. See Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New
Penology, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 417, 418–19 (2009) (noting the de-emphasis of due process in
drug courts but recommending a different solution in the form of specialized grand juries).
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the social context not simply out of fear of punishment. As a result, even
if the threat of punishment is reduced, defendants are unlikely to talk back
in court.
A.

Sovereign Power

Critiques of legal regimes usually focus—for good reason—on what
Foucault called sovereign power, which is the coercive power of the state
to punish and to force action through court orders.175 Bluntly put, it is the
power of violence.176 The state’s power to exercise violence is far from
subtle in criminal law. Violence begins with the police encounter.177
Police exercise violence when they stop and arrest regardless of whether
their actions are lawful.178 That they are endowed with the power to
physically restrain, detain, and spirit people away to jail cells signals the
extent of sovereign power. And, of course, their seeming impunity to
consequences for their own illegal actions when they harm or kill people
only heightens the impression of their sovereignty.179
A person can be arrested for any crime—even a crime for which no
period of incarceration may be imposed upon conviction.180 Indeed, even
failing to wear a seatbelt may lawfully result in arrest.181 As a result, the
threat of caging—a loss of liberty and all of the degradation, violence, and
fear endemic to incarceration—remains an ever-present threat no matter
how trivial the ordinance or law violated.182 Moreover, the threat remains
so long as the case is open. As discussed in Part I, a defendant upon whom
sub-carceral sanctions are imposed risks arrest and incarceration for
175. FOUCAULT, supra note 50, at 48–49 (discussing punishment as a manifestation and display of
the sovereign’s power).
176. See generally Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1607 (1986)
(making explicit the force behind court orders and noting in particular that “most prisoners walk into
prison because they know they will be dragged or beaten into prison if they do not walk”).
177. Harmon, supra note 30, at 327–28.
178. Allegra M. McLeod, Confronting Criminal Law’s Violence The Possibilities of Unfinished
Alternatives, 8 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 109, 111–12 (2013) (describing policing and
prosecution as acts of violence, lawful or unlawful).
179. Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 66–67 (2017).
180. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (finding no Fourth Amendment
violation where petitioner was arrested for the crime of failing to wear a seatbelt, a crime not
punishable by jail time).
181. Id.
182. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 13, at 184–85 (discussing impact of arrest from a
sociological perspective as a “ceremony of degradation” and “role dispossession” (first citing Harold
Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. SOCIO. 420, 424 (1956)
(describing court proceedings as ceremonies of degradation); and then citing ERVING GOFFMAN,
ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 14 (1961)
(describing the “role dispossession” that occurs when apprehended and incarcerated))).
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failure to comply with the conditions the court imposed. In sum, there is
never a time when the threat of being physically seized and caged in a cell
is not present.
It is not hard to imagine how fear of the court’s power to incarcerate
might lead a pro se defendant to be agreeable, and even to agree to pay an
unaffordable fine, all the while thinking, “I have no choice but to find a
way to pay that.”183 Moreover, the threat of being found in contempt of
court may inhibit defendants. Part of the court’s sovereign power is the
power to punish parties and attorneys for failing to obey court orders.184
A defendant might fear that they will be charged with contempt should
they interrupt the judge or otherwise disrupt the rapid resolution of the
case even if the defendant’s contemplated interruption could not
legitimately serve as grounds for a contempt charge.185
Short of contempt charges, defendants correctly assess that they can be
punished for rejecting plea offers and asserting their trial rights.186 In
criminal cases, defendants possess little power against the state. En masse,
defendants could “crash” the misdemeanor system by refusing to plead
guilty, thereby forcing the prosecution to decide which cases were serious
enough to pursue.187 But individual defendants are punished for rejecting
plea offers and otherwise asserting their rights.188 In other words,
defendants are “coerced to plead guilty because the penalty for exercising

183. At its extreme, sovereign power over defendant speech sometimes includes the threat of
sanctions for contempt, removal from the courtroom, gagging, or electrical shock to control
defendants in the courtroom. See, e.g., United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1301–02 (11th Cir.
2002) (describing use of electric shock on a defendant during trial as causing pain and keeping
defendant from conferring with his attorney or participating in his defense).
184. Criminal contempt risks chilling advocacy efforts and, thus, should be reserved for situations
in which an attorney or party obstructs the proceedings. In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 233–34
(1962). The classic example is in the trial of the Chicago Seven, in which the trial judge found the
defendants and defense counsel guilty of 159 instances of contempt of court for their conduct during
the trial, and defendant Bobby Seale guilty of sixteen additional counts of contempt. JOHN SCHULTZ,
THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY TRIAL 372 (Univ. of Chi. Press 2009) (1993).
185. See Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L.J.
1435, 1450 (2009) (discussing contempt charges as one of several types of crimes of “obstinacy” that
manifest resistance to the processing of criminal cases).
186. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364–65 (1978) (finding no constitutional violation
where rejection of plea offer led to enhanced penalties sought under a recidivist statute). Contra North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969) (holding that “vindictiveness against a defendant for
having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a
new trial”).
187. See Roberts, supra note 28, at 1094–95.
188. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364–65 (finding no constitutional violation where rejection of plea
offer led to enhanced penalties sought under a recidivist statute). Contra Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725
(holding that “vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction
must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial”).
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their constitutional rights is simply too high to risk.”189
The defendant may be further convinced that silence is the best option
by witnessing the court express anger toward defense counsel who
advocate zealously for their clients. In the Ferguson courts, for example,
the Department of Justice found that defense counsels’ “[a]ttempts to raise
legal claims [were] met with retaliatory conduct.”190 Judges threatened to
incarcerate defense counsel who asserted their client’s trial right and
attempted to cross-examine witnesses.191 Even without the direct threat of
sanctions, defense counsel may be coaxed into cooperativeness in order
to preserve cordial relations with the prosecutor, hoping for mercy toward
the client and future clients.192 If defense counsel cannot contest the
process or the prosecution, how can defendants?
Finally, as elaborated upon in the discussion of social-emotional power
later in this Part, even courts that emphasize rehabilitation, rather than
punishment, rely on sovereign power for defendants who do not comply
with treatment. As Judge Calabrese explained regarding the use of
incarceration in the Red Hook community court, incarceration is a “tool”
that the court uses to “get[] the person to understand [what will happen] if
he or she continues down that road.”193 In other words, the threat of
violence is always part of the sovereign’s power even if it is not exercised
in the moment. Just underneath the surface of every court directive—even
the court officer’s request that the defendant must sit still and be quiet in
the audience—is the threat of incarceration.
B.

Disciplinary Power

Foucault’s idea of disciplinary power is helpful to understanding why
defendants may remain silent or compliant even in instances when the fear
of incarceration is not top of mind. Disciplinary power works in concert
189. NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS., THE TRIAL PENALTY: THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT
TRIAL ON THE VERGE OF EXTINCTION AND HOW TO SAVE IT 5 (2018) (emphasis in original),
https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/95b7f0f5-90df-4f9f-9115-520b3f58036a/the-trial-penalty-thesixth-amendment-right-to-trial-on-the-verge-of-extinction-and-how-to-save-it.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K4H2-S3YN].
190. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 161, at 43. The Ferguson court is a municipal court which has
been described as serving the primary function of generating revenue from traffic citations. THOMAS
HARVEY, JOHN MCANNAR, MICHAEL-JOHN VOSS, MEGAN CONN, SEAN JANDA & SOPHIA KESKEY,
ARCHCITY DEFS., ARCHCITY DEFENDERS: MUNICIPAL COURT WHITE PAPER 11–12 (2014).
191. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 161, at 44.
192. Charlie Gerstein points out that failing to vigorously defend a client in order to preserve
relations with the prosecutor constitutes an ethical violation. Charlie Gerstein, Dependent Counsel,
16 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 147, 166–67 (2020).
193. NOLAN, supra note 157, at 14; see also id. at 19 (describing sanctions for failing to follow the
treatment plan in mental health court).
TO
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with sovereign power to coax people to behave in particular ways in order
to create “docile” subjects.194 Contrasting the spectacle of public
executions to the inner workings of modern prisons, Foucault argued that
punishment had become “a school rather than a festival,” where the
punished and the public were trained to obey the laws in a methodical—
rather than spectacular—way.195 Foucault observed that prisoners are
subject to regimented schedules and endless rules.196 Their ability to
comply with the schedules and rules, Foucault noted, was closely
monitored. To make this point, Foucault used Jeremy Bentham’s
architectural design for a panopticon prison, in which the prisoners can be
viewed from one central location.197 Aware that they are visible (even if
not always under surveillance), the prisoners know that the state’s power
over them is ever-present even in the absence of an immediate threat
of force.198
Foucault argued that the panopticon model was not limited to the
architectural design of prisons but also applies to institutions like schools
and the military.199 Disciplinary power flourishes in any enclosed space
that becomes a “protected place of disciplinary monotony.”200 Consider
the courtroom as a panopticon. At first blush, it seems that the audience
observes the judge and lawyers. But, as one sits in the audience, one
realizes that the court officer surveils the audience, sometimes requesting
that people sit in different locations, be quiet, turn off their phones, or take
their children outside. The judge, centrally located and often seated at a
higher elevation, may surveil the audience when a case is called, and may
watch the defendant step up to the front of the courtroom to be heard. Even
if the judge rarely looks out, the ability to surveil the room from the bench
confers the power of the panopticon because the audience knows that—at
any moment—the judge could glance up and see them.201 The ability to
surveil the whole courtroom for compliance is an essential part of the

194. See FOUCAULT, supra note 50, at 136.
195. Id. at 111.
196. This was particularly so in the “Philadelphia model” penitentiary. Id. at 123–26.
197. Id. at 200.
198. Id. at 201.
199. Id. at 205 (describing the panopticon as “polyvalent in its applications”). Here, I disagree with
Kohler-Hausmann’s claim that Foucault’s disciplinary power is different from managerial justice in
the lower courts because the courts do not constantly surveil. See KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note
13, at 8–9, 222. Foucault was clear that the panopticon was not architectural, but a “generalizable
model of functioning” that defined “power relations.” FOUCAULT, supra note 50, at 205.
200. FOUCAULT, supra note 50, at 141.
201. Id. at 201 (noting that surveillance need not be continuous if the ability to surveil is known by
the objects of discipline).
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disciplinary power of the panopticon.202
Of course, it is debatable whether criminal courts function as an orderly
system. The rules in the courtroom may be unwritten and variable. As one
former defendant reported, “I knew some of the rules, but I don’t know
all their rules because every day they come up with a different
rule. . . . Like Monday, they might let you wear your hair rag all week
long, the following week, no head rags, no do-rags, stuff like that.”203 Yet,
courts are orderly in that they move along predictable lines of time and
activity. Order in this sense means an “arrangement” or “system,” and
derives from the Latin word, ordiri, which is associated with setting up a
loom for weaving.204 Like a loom strung long ago, one case after another
is threaded through in the same manner. By fitting each defendant into a
capsule of the three-minute hearing, the court succeeds in “transform[ing]
the confused, useless or dangerous multitudes into ordered
multiplicities.”205 To expand the hearing’s length or content by talking
back would disrupt the pace and sequence of case processing, causing
disorder.
Indeed, Foucault specifically identified the “time-table” as a way to
regulate people by setting rhythms and engaging them in “cycles of
repetition.”206 Time is the province of judge, whose time is not to be
wasted but always to be used efficiently. Thus, although the defendant
may wait on the bench for hours for the case to be called, the defendant
must be present at the exact moment when his case is called so as not to
interfere with the orderly proceedings of the court.207 Moreover,
movement is curtailed: gestures and movement that are not directly related
to accomplishing the goal at hand are strongly discouraged.208 Defendants
are expected to sit quietly and stand to approach the bench only when
asked. In this environment, talking back would disrupt the function of the
court by prolonging the hearing and changing the script.
As a result, even before the court orders the defendant to comply with
conditions of release or probationary terms, the court may accomplish its
goal of training through the courtroom’s panopticon effect. A defendant

202. Id. at 197 (arguing that the “enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the
individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are
supervised, . . . constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism”).
203. SWANER ET AL., supra note 60, at 33.
204. SKEAT, supra note 8, at 405 (defining “order”).
205. FOUCAULT, supra note 50, at 148.
206. Id. at 149.
207. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 13, at 216.
208. Id. at 8 (describing Foucault’s view of a prison as a place where “movements are constantly
observed and corrected”).
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who is late for court may be admonished in public and have the case called
last, increasing the defendant’s waiting time by hours. A defendant who
speaks loudly or whose cell phone rings from the audience will be openly
admonished by the court or by the court officer.209 A defendant who
approaches the front of the courtroom before the case is called to get the
attention of a lawyer will be admonished and ordered to sit down. A
defendant who sits in an area reserved for attorneys will be asked to move
to seating for the public. A defendant who, when the case is called, stands
in the wrong place, will be instructed exactly where to stand. A defendant
who mutters disagreement or shakes their head during the reading of the
charges will also be admonished to be silent. Surveillance and correction
of the defendant’s conduct in court signals in no uncertain terms that what
is expected from the defendant is not spirited argument in the adversarial
tradition but, rather, good behavior.
More to the point, the disciplinary power of the court may foreclose
even the thought of talking back. The combination of regimentation and
oversight trains people to behave in orderly ways. In the words of
Foucault:
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it,
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes
them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the
power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he
becomes the principle in his own subjection.210
Eventually, thought Foucault, the prisoners in the prison’s panopticon
would internalize the regimented structure and behave as if they are being
watched.211 They would discipline themselves, thus becoming docile
subjects.212 According to Kohler-Hausmann, the emphasis on the
disciplinary function of criminal courts is most obvious in the lower courts
that handle misdemeanor cases.213 Misdemeanor crimes are often
disturbances of public order, such as disorderly conduct, obstructing a
sidewalk, trespassing, low-level drug possession, open containers of
209. Id. at 216–17.
210. FOUCAULT, supra note 50, at 202–03.
211. Id. at 201 (noting that, through the illusion of perpetual monitoring, prisoners begin to monitor
themselves).
212. The same disciplinary structure functions in other spheres of governed social life. The
subject—whether of the workshop, orphanage, school, prison, or military—was expected to
internalize compliance and accept penalties for failures in many areas. These include, inter alia, areas
related to “time (latenesses, absences, interruptions of tasks)” as well as behavioral lapses, including
“impoliteness, disobedience” and mistakes of speech, attitude, and physical appearance and gesture.
Id. at 178.
213. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 13, at 4–5 (arguing that the misdemeanor court model is
“managerial” rather than “adjudicative”).
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alcohol, traffic offenses, and unlicensed work.214 All of these crimes seem
to have something to do with “demeanor”—the opposite of
“misdemeanor.” A misdemeanor, then, is an error of demeanor, a breach
of what is expected in orderly social life. As such, misdemeanors trigger
a “presumption of the need for social control.”215 Underlying this is an
idea of an unruly underclass that is “impoverished, chaotic, lawless, druginfested, and ruled by violence.”216 Defendants are expected to (and know
they are expected to) dispel any inkling that they fit within the description
of the unruly underclass.
The lower, criminal courts monitor and manage misdemeanants using
several surveillance techniques.217 They surveil defendants’ behavior both
in the courtroom and through observing whether the defendants can
complete tasks ordered by the court, with or without any formal
adjudication of guilt.218 These tasks create an obstacle course of
“procedural hassle” through which defendants demonstrate whether they
can function in an orderly way.219 The procedural hassles include
complying with court orders, appearing for court dates, showing up to
court on time, waiting for the case to be called.220 Through their
compliance, defendants demonstrate to the court that they do not need
further supervision.221 A defendant’s failure to follow court orders triggers
214. The Department of Justice Report on the Baltimore Police Department documented the most
common misdemeanor arrests: disorderly conduct, trespassing, resisting arrest, hindering an officer,
failure to obey an officer, and making a false statement to the officer. C.R. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
INVESTIGATION OF THE BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT 55–56 (2016), https://www.justice.
gov/crt/file/883296/download [https://perma.cc/V3B3-2VAK]. Another common charge the report
noted was gaming (playing dice). Id. at 56.
215. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 13, at 77–78.
216. Id. at 228 (quoting Elijah Anderson, The Iconic Ghetto, 642 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 8, 9 (2012)).
217. In these cases, wrote Feeley, “adjudication is little more than a book-keeping ritual, a formality
necessary to terminate a problem which for all practical purposes has already been resolved.” FEELEY,
supra note 36, at 24.
218. That adjudication has wholly given way to monitoring and managing is highlighted by
Kohler-Hausmann’s data demonstrating that conviction rates in New York have not kept pace with
increases in misdemeanor arrests. Rather, courts increasingly agree to dismiss cases on the condition
that the defendant complete certain tasks like treatment programs and monetary payments.
Kohler-Hausmann, supra note 149, at 642 (showing that the conviction rate for misdemeanors in New
York fell from 44% to 19% in the era of “broken windows” policing).
219. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 13, at 183.
220. Id. at 218–219.
221. Id. at 5. Kohler-Hausmann refers to it as “managerial justice” as distinct from Foucault’s
disciplinary power and, thus, would probably disagree with my characterization of the lower courts
as similar to Foucault’s analysis of prison. She cites to another study distinguishing the looser power
structures of policing with Foucault’s “total institution” of the penitentiary. Id. at 8–9 (citing Alice
Goffman, On the Run Wanted Men in a Philadelphia Ghetto, 74 AM. SOCIO. REV. 339, 355 (2009))
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the imposition of more court orders—perpetual payment of portions of
fines, and numerous days spent waiting in the audience for one’s case to
be called.222
Disciplinary power is thus subtle and diffuse, but, once identified, we
can see how the court orders to return to court, pay a fine, or take a class
do more than tax defendants’ time, money, and liberty. The process is the
punishment,223 but the process also is the training, shaping the defendant
into a compliant and orderly person. My further argument is this: Orders
that require the defendant to complete tasks outside of the courtroom, such
as paying a fine or taking a class, encourage the defendant to behave
cooperatively in the courtroom. The tasks cause defendants to internalize
the disciplinary process, rendering defendants much less likely to talk
back in court.
Returning to Foucault, again, the central aim of disciplinary power is
that the person eventually imposes discipline on themselves without any
direct threat from the sovereign. To determine whether this internalization
has occurred, some courts—particularly those focused on rehabilitation—
may demand verbal confirmation from the defendant. For example, drug
courts may require the defendant to verbally “demonstrat[e] the
recovering self.”224 Defendants in drug court are expected to announce
that they are addicts and to answer questions about their perspectives on
authority in very particular ways.225 In one instance, researchers observed
a judge prodding a defendant to agree that he had become “[h]umble” and
“willing to listen.”226 Prodded to say “the right things,” defendants
demonstrate that they have internalized the court’s discipline, or at least
understand that such a showing is what is expected of them when they are
(explaining that policing in Philadelphia led targets of police to be “less like captives in a Foucauldian
panoptic power regime and more like fugitives within porous social and physical spaces”). Foucault,
however, did not envision perpetual surveillance in an architectural panopticon as the only example
of disciplinary power. Instead, he noted that the potential for being observed coupled with techniques
of discipline were the hallmark of disciplinary power. FOUCAULT, supra note 50, at 203.
222. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 13, at 1 (“[C]omparatively trivial infractions entangle
people in the tentacles of the criminal justice system, impose burdens to comply with judicial
processes, require time away from work and children, entail fees and fines, and generate records that
can be accessed by potential employers, landlords, or other important decisions makers.”).
223. This is the title of Malcolm Feeley’s seminal book on the lower courts. See FEELEY, supra
note 36.
224. Stacy Lee Burns & Mark Peyrot, Tough Love Nurturing and Coercing Responsibility and
Recovery in California Drug Courts, 50 SOC. PROBS. 416, 430 (2003); id. at 417 (arguing that
therapeutic culture infiltrating legal settings results in “areas of human life [being] open to judicial
exploration” including the “mind, psyche and soul of the individual” (quoting JAMES NOLAN,
REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 183–84 (2001))).
225. Id. at 424 (reporting instance of a judge denying further participation in drug court to a
defendant who would not announce in open court that he was an addict).
226. Id. at 431 (emphasis omitted).
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called upon to speak in court.227 As the next section discusses, the power
of the court is enhanced even more by the social-emotional aspects of its
interactions with the defendant.
C.

Social-Emotional Power

Like all social spaces, the courtroom has an emotional tone and a range
of emotional expressions that are permitted or frowned upon. This is
perhaps the most subtle form of power that silences defendants in the
courtroom, and one that is the most difficult to define. It influences not
just what defendants must do but also how they must do it. The defendant’s
emotional tone, expressed through attitude, countenance, and demeanor,
as well as words (if any), will be part of what the court considers in
determining how much monitoring, control, and supervision to impose.
This can be thought of as the defendant’s social-emotional performance.
The expected social-emotional tone is communicated to the defendant
through a variety of courtroom cues as well as through the court’s more
dramatic reactions to defendants who display forbidden emotions or
otherwise appear agitated in ways that disrupt the court’s perception of
itself as an orderly place.
1.

The Impact of Stigma on Courtroom Behavior

The layout of the courtroom, combined with the structured roles played
by courtroom professionals, influences “what people say and the way that
they say it.”228 The social-emotional regime of the courtroom dictates who
can express which emotions to whom. As a general matter, courts permit
only “minimal emotional display.”229 What emotions may be displayed
depends on the person’s role in the courtroom. Righteous anger on behalf
of victims may be expressed by the prosecutor, and then by the judge
at sentencing.230
Defendants, however, have much less leeway to express emotion, in
part due to the stigmatized role they play in the courtroom.231 Being
arrested, charged with a crime, and brought before a tribunal of judgment
is a “degradation ceremony” in which the defendant plays the person who
is degraded.232 The defendant—the stigmatized person starring in the
227. Id. at 432.
228. GRUBER, supra note 22, at 22.
229. Id. at 23.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61 AM. J. SOCIO.
420 (1956).
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court’s degradation ceremony—is likely to feel anxious and
“unanchored”233 in court.234 The anxiety is well-founded. Others may be
quick to read “unintended meanings” into the stigmatized person,
perceiving the defendant as “either too aggressive or too shamefaced.”235
To compensate, the defendant may try to appear less stigmatized by
behaving just like the courtroom professionals in spite of the fact that their
internal reaction to being prosecuted likely engenders strong emotions.236
Without daily experience in the criminal court, defendants “tap into
cultural notions of appropriate language for this context to a degree
greater than usual.”237 Gruber, for example, noted that about half of the
defendants who spoke at sentencing used “politeness markers” such as
“please,” “thank you,” and referring to the judge as “sir,” or “ma’am,” or
“Your Honor.”238
Moreover, to manage the stigmatized role, the defendant may feel
particularly concerned with avoiding feelings of shame and the attendant
assaults on dignity that come with admitting, for example, that one does
not have money to pay a fine or transportation to get to a community
service center. Managing how one is perceived by others by regulating
one’s emotional expression may thus become a central preoccupation of
the defendant in court.239 Orderliness is not generally considered an
emotion, but, I argue, certain emotions are readily associated with
orderliness: mildness, politeness, and agreeability. Displaying these
emotions assists the defendant in managing the stigma of criminal identity
in court.
In contrast, straying from the appropriate spectrum of emotional
expression may lead to further shaming. In an observational study of drug
courts, researchers noted a judge who reprimanded a defendant for crying
in open court while describing her relapse into drug use.240 Interpreting
the tears as an attempt to use emotion to manipulate the outcome of the
status hearing, the judge told her, “Cut the garbage and save the tears
233. GOFFMAN, supra note 182, at 18.
234. GRUBER, supra note 22, at 23.
235. GOFFMAN, supra note 182, at 18.
236. Id. at 41–42.
237. GRUBER, supra note 22, at 23–24.
238. Id. at 126. Interestingly, almost all lawyers addressing the court used these terms of politeness
consistently. Id. This seems to suggest that defendants are less accultured to the court’s rules of
decorum than their attorneys.
239. And, indeed, in jury trials, juries may judge the defendant’s demeanor an important variable
in their verdicts. See Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor The Theater of the Courtroom, 92
MINN. L. REV. 573, 582 (2008) (describing the impact of the defendant’s demeanor at counsel table
as influencing jurors).
240. Burns & Peyrot, supra note 224, at 427–28.
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because they are not doing a thing for me.”241 This exchange could be
interpreted narrowly to mean that the judge did not credit the authenticity
of the defendant’s tears. Indeed, the judge turned to the audience and said,
“Notice how she stopped crying when I told her to?”242 The exchange
could also be interpreted more broadly as a prohibition against emotional
pleas for mercy. Other defendants observing the hearing likely would
decide to calibrate their tone and exclude pleas for understanding or
mercy. It is reasonable to expect that observing the judge reprimand
defendants who express certain emotions will lead other defendants to
shape their emotional expression to the preferences of the court.
The above example raises another inhibiting aspect of the defendant’s
stigmatized role in the courtroom. Stigma has what has been called a
“spoiling effect” on the defendant’s credibility.243 The listener may
interpret the defendant’s speech more negatively than the speech of others
who do not carry the stigma of being charged with a crime.244 Interpreting
another person’s emotional cues is difficult, but the overlay of stigma
makes it more likely that the court will view the defendant’s display of
emotion in a cynical light. Kohler-Hausmann recalls, for example, a judge
stopping mid-plea colloquy because the defendant was smiling.245 The
judge told the defendant to sit in the audience and wait for a second call
when, apparently, he should complete his change of plea and sentencing
without smiling. Perhaps the defendant smiled to communicate to the
court that he was not a threat, or because he was relieved to have the case
resolved in a way acceptable to him. But the court seemed to interpret his
smiling as disrespect or as a failure to feel somber and shame-faced during
an adjudication of criminal guilt.
Moreover, one could liken the judge’s rebuke described above to a
parent telling a child to wipe the smile off of their face. Infantilizing
defendants by directing them not to smile and not to cry further entrenches
the social-emotional power of the court. Shaming coerces submission, and
is thus a strategy for inhibiting the behavior of others in the courtroom.246
Given the subjectivity involved in interpreting other people’s feelings,

241. Id. at 427.
242. Id. at 428.
243. GRUBER, supra note 22, at 23 (citing GOFFMAN, supra note 182); id. at 149 (describing the
stigma of being a defendant in a criminal case as having “a tainting effect that causes the defendant
to be viewed as an unreliable narrator”).
244. Id.
245. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 13, at 216.
246. Heidi L. Maibom, The Descent of Shame, 80 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RSCH. 566, 567–
68 (2010) (arguing that shame is a social, heteronomous emotion that descends into submission in
ways that are directly affected by social rank).
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racial bias certainly must play a role in skewing judicial assessments of
some defendants’ demeanor and tone.247 Black people charged with
crimes may be particularly at risk of both misinterpretation and ill will in
judicial assessments of their courtroom demeanor and speech.248 In
particular, a judge may view similar actions and words as disorderly when
coming from a Black defendant but neutral when coming from a white
defendant.249
It is deeply inhibiting to worry that one’s statements, demeanor, and
emotional tone in court might be misinterpreted.250 Anticipating disbelief,
defendants may remain emotionally muted and unwilling to speak. This
phenomenon may be exacerbated for Black defendants who are attuned to
stereotype threat, meaning the awareness and concern that one will be
judged unfairly according to an existing stereotype.251 L. Song Richardson
and Phillip Atiba Goff note that stereotype threat “often provokes anxiety,
leading to physical and mental reactions that are difficult, if not
impossible to volitionally control such as increased heart rate, fidgeting,
sweating, averting eye gaze, and cognitive depletion.”252 Aware of biases
equating Blackness with disorder and danger, Black defendants may
curtail their anger, resistance, frustration, and agitation in order to reduce
the chance that they are perceived in stereotypical ways. But the problem
is by no means limited to Black defendants. Jamelia Morgan notes, for
example, that people seen as outside the norm, such as people with
disabilities or people transgressing traditional gender roles, often are
treated as disorderly by criminal legal practices.253 In an effort not to be
judged in accordance with this disorderly stereotype, many people will be
reticent to talk back in court. The result is “testimonial quieting,” meaning

247. Hanan, supra note 22, at 329.
248. Jennifer Saul, Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and Epistemic Injustice, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE 235 (Ian James Kidd, José Medina & Gaile Pohlhaus eds., 2017).
249. See Jamelia N. Morgan, Rethinking Disorderly Conduct, 109 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 21–22) (on file with author). In this Article, I do not capitalize “white” when
referring to white people, a practice of keeping with the style guidelines of the Associated Press and
other sources of journalism. See David Bauder, AP Says It Will Capitalize Black but Not White,
ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS (July 20, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/entertainment-cultures-raceand-ethnicity-us-news-ap-top-news-7e36c00c5af0436abc09e051261fff1f?fbclid=iwar3ce_
jafescsctubg3wt-wvgyoga_ckqgjxnbe6rikneugst5bshdi8b9k [https://perma.cc/62HL-ZV4F].
Capitalizing “white” risks legitimizing a white identity mythologized by white supremacists. Id.
250. A defendant’s speech may be “muted” when he talks about his experience, but his speech is
misunderstood because it does not fit into the law’s linguistic framework. Shirley Ardener, Ardener’s
“Muted Groups” The Genesis of an Idea and Its Praxis, 28 WOMEN & LANGUAGE 50 (2005).
251. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM.
L. 115, 124–28 (2014).
252. Id. at 124.
253. Morgan, supra note 249.
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the decision not to speak when one senses it will be futile or dangerous
to speak.254
Defendants also take cues from the cases called before their case. A
defendant watching the proceedings may see that some defendants are
given more of an opportunity to speak than others. In surveys and
interviews with former criminal defendants in Ohio and New Jersey,
researchers found that the judge invited some defendants to speak but “cut
off” others.255 Specifically, participants with substance abuse issues or a
criminal history described fewer invitations to speak.256 In another series
of interviews with people who had active bench warrants for failing to
appear in court, interviewees “described a system that did not respect,
empathize, or show concern for who they were and their situation,”
sometimes pointing to instances in which the judge did not permit the
person “to explain himself and his situation.”257 One interviewee
explained why he did not even try to explain his situation to the judge:
[T]here’s no sympathy, there’s no empathy, just you do the crime
you’re going to do the time, so anything else I’m dealing with
personally I just feel like it’s going to be looked upon and deemed
irrelevant so it doesn’t matter . . . . 258
In such a setting, social-emotional power dampens defendants’
expression of emotion through shaming and other social cues. The court
may, for example, demonstrate the social-emotional demeanor expected
of the defendant through its disregard and hostility. In her ethnography of
Chicago’s largest criminal court, Nicole Gonzales Van Cleve found that
self-represented defendants, “[w]ithout litigating skills, a law degree, and
the cultural know-how to navigate their own trial, . . . were often laughed
at like bumbling idiots.”259 In these impossible situations, talking back
risks unknown consequences. Defendants work hard to appear muted and
controlled, and struggle to avoid the court’s disapprobation.
2.

Emotions that Threaten the Court’s Sense of Order

The court may forbid—through social-emotional cues and
punishment—speech that challenges the court’s sense of orderliness.

254. Saul, supra note 248, at 235.
255. SWANER ET AL., supra note 60, at vii.
256. Id.
257. DUDA-BANWAR & BURT, supra note 30, at 16.
258. Id.
259. VAN CLEVE, supra note 36, at 43. In what Van Cleve describes as a fear of “encroachment”
into their professional territory, lawyers and judges will often shame the defendant requesting to
proceed pro se by asking him a question about the law that he cannot answer. Id. at 177–78.
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Before providing examples, I would like to return to the theme of the
court’s order to note a seeming paradox. While defendants are held
accountable for slips in their orderliness, it is not at all clear that the
courtroom is a place of order. Even a casual observer will note that the
tumult in the courtroom rarely comes from the defendants.260 The idea of
the court as a place of orderliness is just that: an idea. It is an emotional,
imaginative idea of order that is often belied by the chaotic and indecorous
proceedings in actual courtrooms. In this sense, the courtroom’s efforts at
orderliness can be understood as more than just a way for courts to process
cases efficiently. The emotional—perhaps normative—aspect of the idea
of orderliness is a symbol of the law’s legitimacy; it is an emotional and
ideological commitment to an idea of balanced justice that, of course, may
never be achieved in the cases before the court.261
As such, judges may experience deep, personal affront when a
defendant violates their sense of courtroom order. In some lower courts,
judges manifest their commitment to order by enforcing rules of decorum
against the defendant amidst the seeming chaos. In a study conducted by
the Center for Court Innovation, for example, a defendant recounted the
judge’s ire and threats when the defendant answered, “Yes,” rather than,
“Yes, sir.”262 After the judge had admonished the defendant to say, “Yes,
sir,” the defendant “slipped up and . . . said ‘yes’ again.”263 In response
the judge said, “If you say ‘yes’ again . . . you’ll face 30 days in jail.”264
This is an example of the threat of sovereign power—the power to
incarcerate—deployed to protect the court’s sense of itself as a place of
order and decorum.
Defendant displays of agitation threaten the court’s sense of its own
orderliness.265 Although it is an extreme case of a judge insisting on order,
the well-publicized incident in which a Texas judge used a stun belt on a

260. Malcolm Feeley described the lower courts he studied as “chaotic and confusing,” “crowded,”
and “dingy.” FEELEY, supra note 36, at 3. But, the observation dates back centuries. Lord Blackstone
was an early critic of the chaos in the courthouse of Westminster Abbey, with its “drowsy bench” and
“babbling Hall.” William Blackstone, The Lawyer’s Farewell to His Muse, reprinted in 1 S.L. REV.
212, 213 (1901); see also ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 190–91 (1930) (noting the
criminal court’s “bad physical surroundings, the confusion,” etc.).
261. TEMPLE, supra note 52, at 183 (“Terry Lee Morris represented this chaos: his behaviors flew
in the face of any ideas we might have about judicial decorum . . . .”).
262. SWANER ET AL., supra note 60, at 33–34.
263. Id. at 34.
264. Id.
265. TEMPLE, supra note 52, at 184. At the same time, Feeley noted New Haven lower court judges
who complained about having no power over the noisiness and disorder of their courtrooms. FEELEY,
supra note 36, at 69–70 (noting that, “[i]f the judge were to insist upon order, he would only call
attention to his weakness and inefficacy”).
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voluble defendant is worth analyzing.266 The defendant, Morris,
repeatedly asked the trial judge to recuse himself and asked that new
counsel be appointed for trial.267 The judge responded by asking Morris,
“Are you going to behave?”268 When Morris continued his requests for
new counsel and for judicial recusal, the judge responded, “Are you going
to answer my questions?”269 When the defendant persisted in his requests,
the judge to ordered the deputy to stun the defendant.270 Traumatized after
being stunned several times for continuing to request new counsel and
judicial recusal, Morris refused to return to the courtroom and the trial
continued without his presence.271
Although the appellate court ultimately held that a stun belt may not be
used for courtroom decorum (but only for security reasons) the decision
highlighted, in dicta, the court’s imagined orderliness juxtaposed with the
imagined chaos of the criminal class:
When the trial judges of this State don their robes and ascend the
bench each morning, those with criminal dockets are often
confronted with defendants who are rude, disruptive,
noncompliant, belligerent, and in some cases, even murderously
violent. In the face of this reality, Texas trial judges shoulder
another heavy burden: the burden to tame the chaos before them,
impose order, and uphold the dignity of the justice system.272
As discussed above, it is not clear that the appellate court’s
characterization of either the court’s orderliness or the defendant’s
disorderliness is accurate. It is, however, clear that orderliness and
decorum function as an emotional regime in the courtroom—a power that
excludes certain ways of acting, particularly emotional expressions of the
agitation that are a normal part of contesting unfairness.273 The defendant
who seems agitated while speaking to the judge is sending out ripples of
disturbance not just through the proceedings, but also through the court’s
concept of itself and of justice.
266. Morris v. State, 554 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. App. 2018).
267. Id. at 103.
268. Id. at 104–05.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 104–05.
272. Id. at 102. The court in Morris v. State went on to cite Illinois v. Allen, in which the Court said
that the trial judge could have (a) warned the defendant he would be removed, (b) cited him for
contempt, and (c) bound and gagged him. 554 S.W.3d 98 (Tex. App. 2018) (citing Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337, 344–45 (1970)). The latter option, the Allen Court warned, was fraught with
constitutional concerns. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344–45.
273. TEMPLE, supra note 52, at 185 (“[T]o the extent that certain emotions go outside the bounds
of what is recognized, they are outlawed, banished from the law, forced out or treated as invisible.”).
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People who catalyze change are called agitators, after all.274 Through
their agitation and outbursts, they are “trying to tell us something about a
system that has broken down.”275 Morris is an extreme example because,
depending on how you interpret his resistance, he may have been refusing
to participate in the proceedings. In Kathryn Temple’s analysis:
A prisoner who refuses bodily, emotionally, and cognitively to
submit to the court’s authority and thus exposes the social
contract in all its fragility, one who exercises his individuality
against law’s desire to categorize and dispose of “cases,” takes on
an outsized importance and cannot be ignored, especially during
times when the law feels itself under threat.276
Less dramatic than stun belts, returning a defendant to lock-up or
setting a high bail on an agitated defendant are more common methods of
enforcing decorum in the courtroom. In a well-publicized video, a
teenager caught shoplifting, who laughed and then made an obscene
gesture and comment to the judge, was disciplined through the imposition
of a higher, monetary bail and then was found in contempt and sentenced
to thirty days in jail.277 In the video, the audience can be heard gasping
and laughing as the judge punished the defendant’s failure to comply with
the decorum he expected her to display over the video feed from the jail
to the courtroom.278 Moreover, mere expressions of judicial apathy and
curtness may prevent defendants from talking back. Defendants—
demonstrating normal sensitivity in reading the emotional tone of the
courtroom—may know that they are expected not to agitate by disrupting
the order of the proceedings or challenging the decisions of the court.
They perform not only by showing up and waiting as they are told, but by
behaving in a mild and agreeable way when called up by the judge,
agreeing with the decisions of the court when called upon to assent.
Defendants learn about the efforts at orderliness in the courtroom when
they attempt to interject during a formalistic part of the hearing, such as
during the recitation of the charges or the plea colloquy.279 Defendants
who stray from the script will be quickly—sometimes sharply—redirected
274. Id. at 186.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 131.
277. Debra Cassens Weiss, Laughing Teen with Jewelry “Like Rick Ross” Gets 30 Days for
Flipping Off Judge, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 6, 2013), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
laughing_teen_with_jewelry_like_rick_ross_gets_30_days_for_flipping_off_jud
[https://perma.cc/8H7G-9NMM].
278. Id.
279. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1464 (noting that defendants who stray from the scripted colloquy
by saying, for example, that they were coerced by the threat of a longer sentence after trial, will see
the entire proceeding stopped “until the ‘correct’ yes or no answer is given”).
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to their lines.280 This “formalistic” way of verbally engaging may give
defendants the impression that unscripted comments are irrelevant and
unwelcome at any point in the hearing.281 The formalism also signals to
the defendant that any deviations from the script—especially through
contestation or disagreement—will not be tolerated.
The social-emotional element of the performance—mildness,
politeness, and agreeability—matters to understanding how difficult it
may be for a defendant to say anything unscripted. Short of agitating and
weeping, defendants may be reluctant to ask that the court to consider
financial or other life circumstances, or to question why the court would
require money from indigent people at all. Indeed, persuasion,
negotiation, and contestation require a degree of disagreement, of friction
between the way things are going and the way the speaker wants them to
go.282 This friction is also essential to ensuring that marginalized voices—
like the voices of criminal defendants—contribute to our understanding
of how criminal courts impact people under their jurisdiction.283
Paradoxically, this type of friction may be all the more difficult in courts
that attempt to set a welcoming tone that permits open dialogue, as
discussed in the next section.
D.

Silencing in Kinder, Gentler Courts

Of course, not all courtrooms are presided over by judges who
intimidate, disbelieve, and shame the defendants. In some courtrooms,
defendants are given a greater opportunity to speak. Imagine a judge
committed to listening and listening well to the defendants who come
before the court. The judge courteously asks the defendant to speak,
eliciting information, and checking to make sure the defendant does not
have any questions, or anything left to say that has not been said. Will
defendants be willing not only to ask questions but also to raise concerns
and contest the proposed disposition in this kinder, gentler court? In this
section, I turn to why kinder, gentler courts almost certainly silence
contestation through diffuse, social-emotional power as well as through
disciplinary power and the threat of the sovereign’s power to punish.
In an effort to improve how courts are perceived and to increase

280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Jocelyn Simonson, Democratizing Criminal Justice Through Contestation and Resistance,
111 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1622 (2017) (discussing organized contestation of criminal legal practices).
283. See José Medina, Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance Counter-Memory,
Epistemic Friction, and Guerilla Pluralism, 12 FOUCAULT STUD. 9, 12 (2011) (arguing that a “vibrant
and feisty epistemic pluralism” is the hallmark of epistemic function).
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compliance with court orders, many courts have attempted to improve
courtroom culture.284 Lower courts are encouraged to, inter alia, enhance
the “procedural justice” in the courtroom,285 and to think about the law’s
purpose and effect from a therapeutic perspective.286 My argument is that
both procedural justice and therapeutic jurisprudence reduce the
appearance of sovereign and disciplinary power while, at the same time,
enhancing the court’s social-emotional power. The court’s enhanced
social-emotional power makes it difficult for the defendant to swim
against the tide of courtesy and cooperation in the courtroom. Although
judges in these treatment-oriented courts still have the power to
incarcerate, that power may not be top of mind for the defendants
appearing before them.287 Nevertheless, the defendant may find it
exceedingly difficult to disagree with court’s edicts, even when warmly
invited to speak. I will address procedural justice first, and then
therapeutic jurisprudence.
Procedural justice is a term used to describe the subjective opinion of
a layperson that a tribunal seemed fair and respectful.288 A legal process
will be perceived as procedurally just if (1) the litigants have an
opportunity to speak; (2) the decision maker seems neutral; (3) the
litigants feel respected; and (4) the litigants feel that the process and result
were clearly explained.289 In his seminal book on procedural justice, Tom
Tyler made clear that procedural justice does not mean that the
proceedings or the outcome is fair in any objective sense. The point of
procedural justice, instead, is to increase laypeople’s confidence in and
allegiance to the legal system.290 Tyler argues that the belief in the
legitimacy of legal authority will lead to law abiding behavior.291
The behavioral effect of procedural justice is endorsed by the court
284. For an excellent critique of neo-rehabilitation, see Jessica M. Eaglin, Against
Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189 (2013).
285. Greg Berman & Julian Adler, Toward Misdemeanor Justice Lessons from New York City, 98
B.U. L. REV. 981, 992 (2018) [hereinafter Berman & Adler, Toward Misdemeanor Justice]. The
authors have also written using similar strategies to reduce mass incarceration. GREG BERMAN &
JULIAN ADLER, START HERE: A ROAD MAP TO REDUCING MASS INCARCERATION (2018) [hereinafter
BERMAN & ADLER, START HERE].
286. Therapeutic jurisprudence is an area of legal scholarship that studies how to “minimize [law’s]
antitherapeutic effects” and “increase law’s therapeutic potential.” Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1062–63 (2003).
287. Mae Quinn made this point in her article on practicing as a public defender in drug treatment
courts. Quinn, supra note 20, at 50–52.
288. John Thibault, Laurens Walker, Stephen LaTour & Pauline Houlden, Procedural Justice as
Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (1974).
289. Berman & Adler, Toward Misdemeanor Justice, supra note 285, at 993.
290. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 143 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006) (1990).
291. Id.
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reform movement. A publication from the Center for Court Innovation
recommends the following steps be taken to ensure procedural justice:
To address voice and respect, judges could use scripts with each
defendant to ask if there is anything about the case or defendants’
personal circumstances they should know about before making a
decision. The script could also provide the judge with reminders
for non-verbal cues such as maintaining eye contact, having a
minimum appearance time for each defendant, and speaking
directly to the defendant.292
In a report on Red Hook Community Court, procedural justice is discussed
as both a feature of the court and as a variable responsible for reduced
recidivism.293 As the report explains,
The greater the degree of perceived procedural justice, the more
likely it is that defendants and litigants will be satisfied with
criminal justice authorities and their decisions, view authorities
as legitimate, and defer to or comply with the decisions made by
the judge and others in authority.294
The report highlights two aspects of procedural justice designed to reduce
recidivism: (1) encouraging defendants’ participation in the disposition,
and (2) requiring judges to “appear benevolent, caring, motivated to treat
parties fairly, and sincerely concerned about people.”295
In this way, procedural justice literature unapologetically embraces
Foucauldian disciplinary power and social-emotional power.296 The more
the defendant feels that that they were well-treated, the less likely the
defendant is to question or challenge the court’s dispositional orders.
Moreover, the greater the feeling of procedural justice, the more likely the
defendant is to accept to the court’s sanctions as necessary steps in the
process of demonstrating orderliness.297 From the perspective of
disciplinary power, procedural justice’s invitation to speak on one’s own

292. SWANER ET AL., supra note 60, at viii.
293. CYNTHIA G. LEE, FRED L. CHEESMAN, II, DAVID B. ROTTMAN, RACHEL SWANER, SUVI
LAMBSON, MIKE REMPEL & RIC CURTIS, A COMMUNITY COURT GROWS IN BROOKLYN: A
COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION OF THE RED HOOK COMMUNITY JUSTICE CENTER 88 (2013),
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/RH%20Evaluation%20Final%20Rep
ort.pdf [https://perma.cc/SD2E-SE6K] (“Procedural justice is a key mechanism through which the
Justice Center aims to achieve reductions in recidivism.”).
294. Id. at 8 (citing TYLER, supra note 290, at 105, 156–57).
295. Id.
296. See supra section II.B.
297. Ethnographers observing Red Hook court describe dialogue between defendants and
courtroom professionals (including judges) that they did not observe in traditional courts. LEE ET AL.,
supra note 293, at 86. One defendant giving a favorable opinion about Judge Calabrese said, “I got a
good feel from Calabrese because of the fact that he likes to interact and get your opinion.” Id.
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behalf to a benevolent and attentive judge is part of the training. From the
perspective of social-emotional power, procedural justice shapes the
defendant’s demeanor and conduct to the emotional tone of the
courtroom—mild and agreeable.298
A court implementing principles of procedural justice may encourage
defendants to speak more freely to the court. This seems to be born out in
a study from the Center for Court Innovation in which 65% of the
defendants interviewed felt that they had an opportunity to express their
views and 69% stated that “the judge listened to [their] side of the story
before making a decision.”299 One participant in the study noted that his
judge listened to him: “[The judge] could have smoked me but he actually
listened and paid attention to my background and was like, ‘You know
what. He not a bad kid, it was just fucked up circumstances.’”300 No doubt
a welcoming judge can create an environment in which some defendants
feel free to speak. This does some good if the defendant provides
information that helps the court make fairer decisions. But the speech that
is encouraged is not speech that talks back or speech that contests the
prosecution in any way. Instead, it is an opportunity to speak that makes
defendants feel they have input when they may not.301
Feeling empowered to speak is a poor substitution for having the power
to contest the proceedings and challenge the court’s narrative of crime and
punishment. The informality of the courtroom may feel inviting, but that
does not mean that the proceedings or outcome will be fairer than in a
more formal, less friendly courtroom. Forty years ago, Richard Abel
argued that coercion is disguised in less formal settings.302 A mediation
session, compared, for example, with a formal court hearing, creates a
backdrop of collegiality that prompts agreeability. Thus, the transition
from formal to informal procedures does not reduce state control. Rather,
298. Moreover, if Foucault is correct about how disciplinary power is internalized to create docile
subjects, procedural justice will make it more likely that the defendant views the court’s requirements
and fair even if they are unattainable in their requirements of her time and money. FOUCAULT, supra
note 50, at 136–37 (describing the creation of docile bodies through disciplinary practices).
299. SWANER ET AL., supra note 60, at 12. Overall, 80% stated that they felt respected by the
court. Id.
300. Id. at 35 (alteration in original).
301. GRUBER, supra note 22, at 160 (noting that defendant allocutions at sentencing do not clearly
result in any benefits to the defendant while, at the same time, serving to validate punitive practices
and to fool defendants into feeling they are “protected”).
302. 1 RICHARD L. ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 5–6
(1982) (“The primary business of informal institutions is social control. Consequently, the central
question must be: Do they expand or reduce state control? The authors in this volume agree with
Foucault that informal justice increases state power. Informal institutions allow state control to escape
the walls of those highly visible centers of coercion—court, prison, mental hospital, school—and
permeate society.”).
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the informality can conceal state control, making it difficult to see and
even more difficult to contest.303
Patricia Williams makes a similar argument, pointing out that
informality typically harms Black people due to power imbalances
resulting from white supremacy.304 In contrast, legal formality can protect
by positioning the person as “a bargainer of separate worth, distinct
power, sufficient rights.”305 In other words, formality is not alienating
when it is part of an acknowledgment that the people involved in the
matter are endowed with rights. Applying Williams’s point to defendants
in criminal cases, the injustices of criminal prosecution are not due to
estrangement between judges and defendants causing judges not to
understand the needs of the defendant but instead are due to the inability
of defendants to assert and protect their rights.306
The trend toward therapeutic jurisprudence shares some of the
characteristics of procedural justice. David Wexler, the pioneer of the
field, made the important observation that it matters how judicial actors
treat people, and it matters how the formal substantive and procedural
aspects of law impact people’s mental health.307 In the context of criminal
prosecutions, therapeutic jurisprudence has been applied in the creation of
specialty courts charged with addressing categories of offenses308 or
defendants.309 These courts attempt to improve criminal court practices so
that they accomplish rehabilitative goals and do not cause
303. ABEL, supra note 302, at 6–7 (“Informal institutions control by disorganizing grievants,
trivializing grievances, frustrating collective responses. Their very creation proclaims the message
that social problems can be resolved by fiddling with the control apparatus once more, that it is
unnecessary to question basic social structures. But informal institutions also foster disorganization
much more directly, by instructing each party that he can, and must, resolve the controversy alone.”).
Richard Delgado has argued that alternative dispute resolution, for example, is a type of informalism
that exacerbates inequalities that might find better protection in the formal rule structure of the
courtroom. Richard Delgado, The Unbearable Lightness of Alternative Dispute Resolution Critical
Thoughts on Fairness and Formality, 70 SMU L. REV. 611 (2017).
304. PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR
148–51 (1991).
305. Id. at 148 (emphasis in original).
306. Id. at 148–151 (countering the critical legal theory endorsement of needs over rights and
informality over formality). This point is especially salient if criminal legal practices are part the
“products of social forces and people who wanted them that way.” Id. at 158.
307. David B. Wexler, The DNA of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in THE METHODOLOGY AND
PRACTICE OF THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 3, 3–4 (Nigel Stobbs, Lorana Bartels & Michel Vols
eds., 2019) (describing how substantive and procedural laws as well as and legal practices can be
therapeutic or “anti-therapeutic,” using the example of civil commitment for mental health crises).
308. Eric J. Miller, The Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Reentry Courts, 20 FED. SENT’G REP.
127, 129 (2007) (discussing the adoption of therapeutic jurisprudence and principles to
problem-solving courts).
309. Erin R. Collins, Status Courts, 105 GEO. L.J. 1481 (2017) (discussing a genre of
problem-solving courts that prosecute defendants who share a trait, like military veterans).
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unintended harm.
A large body of scholarship critiques whether problem-solving courts
achieve their goals and whether their costs to defendants in time, privacy,
and (sometimes) fees outstrip their benefits.310 At best, these courts link
defendants to important social services.311 While many people charged
with low-level crimes may be in need of social services, critics question
whether criminal court—with its power to shame and incarcerate—is the
proper place for these services.312 Despite criticism, the techniques of
problem-solving courts are of broad relevance because they are
increasingly implemented in traditional criminal courts.313
Like procedural justice, therapeutic jurisprudence enhances the judge’s
power to keep defendants on script and away from talking back. In his
scholarship on reentry courts (a type of problem-solving court), Eric
Miller describes the disciplinary and social-emotional power of the judge
as “collateral judicial authority.”314 This type of authority “emanates from
the repeated interactions between the judge and the variety of court
officers and other players.”315 In addition to the court’s power to order
conduct and incarcerate, the judge exercises social-emotional power by
attempting to “establish a dynamic, personal relationship with each
offender.”316 Miller goes on to say:
[T]he judge may also engage in an informal “theater” of personal
suasion, in which the court setting, the official robes, the state
seal, and the other symbols of office combine with some form of
individualized relationship between client and judge to provide
an opportunity to intervene to change the client’s way of thinking
and acting.317
310. Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough Problem-Solving Courts and the
Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1489 (2004).
311. Miller, supra note 308, at 127 (describing managerial orientation in some problemsolving courts).
312. Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts Possibilities and Perils of a Shifting Criminal
Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1614 (2012) (critiquing the therapeutic jurisprudence model of criminal
specialty courts as conflating traditional criminal justice goals with therapeutic goals and suggesting
a diversion of cases to extra-judicial therapeutic programs).
313. NOLAN, supra note 157, at 21 (describing “cross-fertilization” between regular and
specialty courts).
314. Miller, supra note 308, at 128.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. Miller quotes another source stating the judge must be “confessor, taskmaster, cheerleader,
and mentor; in turn exhorting, threatening, encouraging and congratulating the participant for his or
her progress, of lack thereof.” Id. (quoting Drug Treatment Options for the Justice System Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Just., Drug Pol’y, & Hum. Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform,
106th Cong. 16 (2000) (testimony of Judge Jeffrey Tauber)).
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This social-emotional, or “relational,” power is amplified through
repeated court appearances.318 The defendant in problem-solving court
meets with the judge multiple times in order to foster a relationship in
which the defendant feels personally and emotionally accountable to
the court.319
This personal engagement between the judge and defendant can be
rehabilitative, particularly because it emphasizes “emotions, empathy,
[and] healing.”320 But the bond created is designed to rehabilitate the
defendant, not to encourage the defendant to contest the court’s process
or decisions. For example, Wexler suggests that judges could incorporate
therapeutic jurisprudence into sentencing hearings by asking the
defendant to “justify” a lesser sentence and suggest terms of probation.321
The defendant’s solicited “input” is confined to a narrow topic of what
punishment is deserved.322 The dialogue between the judge and the
defendant will be less formal than the plea colloquy, but it is not at all
clear that there is room for contestation or debate about the process,
conviction, or the fairness of imposing any punishment at all.323
To be sure, the judge in many problem-solving courts may be “warm,
friendly, and accessible.”324 And this environment may encourage
defendants to speak more freely. But two problems appear likely. First,
the social-emotional tone of the courtroom all but ensures that defendants
will feel obligated to cooperate rather than contest, as described above.
The chance to speak for oneself should matter. And the chance to speak
should be enhanced by informal, friendly judges. Paradoxically, however,
the opposite is possible. The danger is that the more friendly the judge,
the more pressure the defendant may feel to accommodate the judge.
Social-emotional power, wielded through procedural justice and
therapeutic jurisprudence, works with disciplinary power to encourage
318. Miller, supra note 174, at 426 (employing the terms “relational” and “productive” to describe
the types of diffuse power exercised by judges in problem-solving courts).
319. Terance D. Miethe, Hong Lu & Erin Reese, Reintegrative Shaming and Recidivism Risks in
Drug Court Explanations for Some Unexpected Findings, 46 CRIME & DELINQ. 522, 529 (2000)
(explaining rationale for multiple meetings between the defendant and judge in a drug court in
Las Vegas).
320. NOLAN, supra note 157, at 32; id. at 18 (describing direct and personal engagement between
the judge and defendant on multiple status dates).
321. Wexler, supra note 307, at 5.
322. Id.
323. In other articles, I have argued that defendants are expected to display remorse and offer only
apologies and amends during sentencing hearings, see Hanan, supra note 22, and in restorative justice
meetings, see M. Eve Hanan, Decriminalizing Violence A Critique of Restorative Justice and
Proposal for Diversionary Mediation, 46 N.M. L. REV. 123 (2016).
324. NOLAN, supra note 157, at 2 (relaying description of Judge Calabrese by staff at the Red Hook
Community Court).
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gratitude and agreeability and discourage contestation.
Defendants are unlikely to see examples of contestation from the
courtroom professionals in most problem-solving courts because
adversarial justice is perceived as incompatible with therapeutic
jurisprudence.325 In therapeutic jurisprudence, the rhetoric of social work
substitutes for legal rhetoric.326 Treatment-based proceedings in a
problem-solving court appear to be collaborative at first, with the judge,
prosecutor, probation officer, caseworker and defense attorney working
together to determine the best course of treatment.327 When the goals of
the defendant and the treatment team diverge, however, the institutional
and social arrangements of problem-solving courts make it difficult for
the defense attorneys to assert their client’s interests adverse to the
treatment team’s goals.328 If it is difficult for attorneys trained in
adversarial lawyering to protect their clients from the team, it is almost
impossible for defendants who rely on the behavior and climate of the
courtroom when they make decisions about how to act and what to say.
The scenario of diverging goals points to the second problem: the
danger that the therapeutic courtroom suddenly will turn punitive because
of the defendant’s failure to comply with court orders. While the goal of
the therapeutic court may be the defendant’s rehabilitation, failures of the
defendant to comply result in escalating forms of coercion until the
rehabilitative goals of the court are overpowered by the punitive goals.329
As one problem-solving court official explained, “We combine
punishment and help.”330 Although the judge encourages, cajoles, and
325. BACH, supra note 23, at 6 (“Collegiality and collaboration are considered the keys to success
in most communal ventures, but in the practice of criminal justice they are in fact the cause of
system failure.”).
326. Amy Sinden, “Why Won’t Mom Cooperate?” A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare
Proceedings, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 343–44 (1999). This dynamic has been demonstrated in
the juvenile court system, designed to focus on “benevolent rehabilitation and socialization in lieu of
retributive punishment.” Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1271 (1998). It took decades for the Supreme Court to
acknowledge the due process concerns under the surface of a superficially therapeutic and
nonadversarial court process that often resulted in year of incarceration. Casey, supra note 310, at
1470–71; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
327. Casey, supra note 310, at 1463.
328. See Meekins, supra note 20, at 3–5 (defenders expected to accept defendant’s waiver of rights
and collaborate with court personnel as part of the treatment team); see also Jane M. Spinak,
Romancing the Court, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 258, 264 (2008) (explaining how “coercive power is central
to the therapeutic problem-solving court model”). Some scholars have noted that defendants fail to
comply with treatment and are sentenced to a series of ever-lengthening periods of incarceration to
compel compliance with treatment. Casey, supra note 310, at 1499.
329. Richard C. Boldt, The “Tomahawk” and the “Healing Balm” Drug Treatment Courts in
Theory and Practice, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIGION GENDER & CLASS 45, 65 (2010).
330. NOLAN, supra note 157, at 13.
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urges defendants to comply with treatment, the power to incarcerate is
always present.
Perhaps the combination of persuasion followed by the threat of force
is nothing new. In relaying Blackstone’s description of peine forte et dure,
Temple reminds us that early English defendants were coaxed and
encouraged to enter a plea in court before they were taken to be tortured.331
And, should the defendant agree to enter a plea, he would be released from
torture and permitted to do so.332 This early example demonstrates,
according to Temple, that “both terror and tenderness [are] juridical
technologies meant to manage resistance.”333 The social-emotional power
of persuasion and kindness control behavior in tandem with the state’s
power to punish. Likewise, the modern defendant’s compliance is
procured through the combination of social-emotional pressures, the
disciplinary structure of performing tasks while under surveillance, and
the fear of the sovereign’s power to punish.
IV. THE VALUE OF TALKING BACK
In this Part, I analyze ways in which talking back in court could
influence criminal legal practices: (1) fairer handling of individual cases;
(2) educating lawyers and judges about the impact of criminal legal
practices, thereby influencing legal analysis, court practice, and policy;
and (3) reinstating contestation as a necessary part of pluralistic
democracy.
Although not the focus of this Article, it has also been argued that
contestation has an ethical dimension as an assertion of the humanity of
the speaker. Talking back is a demonstration of agency, establishing the
defendant as a person rather than an object.334 The silenced person is
unable to participate in an activity essential to being human:
communicating information to others.335 People charged with crimes
understand early in the process that they are excluded as conveyers of

331. TEMPLE, supra note 52, at 125; BLACKSTONE, supra note 52, at *320 (describing that the court
must explain three times what will happen if the defendant does not enter a plea and give them a few
hours to think it over before commencing torture).
332. BLACKSTONE, supra note 52, at *322.
333. TEMPLE, supra note 52, at 114. Perhaps this shortens the conceptual gap between tenderness
and tenderizing.
334. JOSÉ MEDINA, THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RESISTANCE: GENDER AND RACIAL OPPRESSION,
EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE, AND THE RESISTANT IMAGINATIONS 84–86 (2013) (discussing the ethical,
epistemic and political implications of epistemic injustice). While not relying on José Medina’s work,
Natapoff notes similar benefits of defendant’s speech. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1452.
335. MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF KNOWING 137 (2007)
(explaining the significance of undermining someone as a knower to moral philosophy).
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knowledge.336 Jack Henry Abbott described the courtroom experience at
the beginning of his training to be silent: “A prisoner begins his ‘training’
in an American courtroom. He is told to shut his mouth unless spoken to.
He is told he is a fool if he tries to be his own lawyer.” 337 The ability to
talk back, in contrast, accords with “personal dignity and choice,
democratic participation, expressive freedom, and the ability to
be heard.”338
The assertion of one’s humanity through talking back in court fits
within the understanding of criminal legal practices in the U.S. as
inextricably intertwined with the history of slavery, convict leasing,
segregation, and the backlash against the civil rights movement.339 As
Dorothy Roberts observes, “[t]he pillars of the U.S. criminal punishment
system—police, prisons, and capital punishment—all have roots in
racialized chattel slavery.”340 With this in mind, legal scholars have linked
resisting surveillance, arrest, prosecution, and punishment to political
resistance of racial subordination.341 Within this framework, talking back,
meaning speaking to an authority figure as an equal, has particular value
and salience.
Nonetheless, top of mind for the reader may be the nagging question of
whether anyone cares about the harm that criminal legal practices work
336. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1450 (“Defendant speech, however, has personal, dignitary, and
democratic import beyond its instrumental role within the criminal case.”).
337. JACK HENRY ABBOTT, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST: LETTERS FROM PRISON 110 (First
Vintage Books 1982) (1981).
338. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1476 (discussing the relationship between First and
Fifth Amendment values); see also Akhil Reed Amar & Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First
Principles The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 925 (1995). Arguably, the dignitary
value of defendant speech is embodied in the defendant’s right to self-representation. Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 823 (1975) (stating defendant has a right to “conduct his cause in his own
words” (quoting 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 211 (2d ed. 1909)));
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 (1984) (noting that “the core of a defendant’s right of selfrepresentation” is the “specific rights to make his voice heard” but trial court may appoint
standby counsel).
339. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2010) (arguing the criminal legal
system perpetuates racial subordination through the facially race neutral tool of mass incarceration).
340. Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword Abolition Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (2019)
(“First, today’s carceral punishment system can be traced back to slavery and the racial capitalist
regime it relied on and sustained.”).
341. See, e.g., Arnett, supra note 42, at 1137–38 (discussing Black resistance to state surveillance
in both historical and current contexts); Bell, supra note 42, at 206–07 (describing Black men running
from the police as a form of resistance); Miller, supra note 42, at 54–59 (arguing that the defendant’s
assertion of trial rights can best be understood within the historical framework of resistance to
slavery); Ristroph, Regulation, supra note 42, at 1564 (arguing that “[r]ights claims [under the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments] are a form of resistance to the state”); see also Ristroph, Respect, supra
note 42, at 605 (arguing that “the Hobbesian right to resist punishment provides a useful
conceptualization of what it means to treat wrongdoers with respect”).
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on the targets of prosecution. In other words, it is unclear whether talking
back in court will lead to fairer outcomes. I weave my thoughts on this
question throughout the discussion, assuming, first, good faith on the part
of legal actors and then analyzing the same questions assuming bad faith
(or indifference) on the part of legal actors.
A.

The Perils and Potential for the Defendant

To illustrate the value of talking back, I return and add to the vignette
of James. Imagine that James stands before the court and responds to the
proposed offer that his case will be dismissed if he pays a fine of $500 by
telling the judge that $500 is too much for him. He is a full-time caregiver
for his grandmother, taking her to regular doctor appointments. He works
for a rideshare company part-time, but only makes $250 per week at that
job. He tells the court that he pays for car insurance and regular repairs of
his twenty-year-old car and buys his grandmother groceries. If we assume
good faith—that the court intends to be fair—then listening to defendants
talk about hardship may add needed realism to the judge’s sentencing
decision. Without knowing that James carried the financial and caretaker
responsibilities in his family, the judge may genuinely not have imagined
$500, paid in, for example, six monthly installments, would be excessive
for James. The extent of the hardship might truly surprise and perplex the
judge and cause the judge to change the fine amount.342
The harm to the defendant can be described both in terms of sentencing
realism and in terms of legal principles. The real impact of the sentence is
more severe for James than for a defendant with more discretionary
income.343 Indeed, if paying the fine caused James to fall behind on car
payments, for example, and lose the car that he needs to earn money as a
rideshare driver, the fine could ruin him. A fine that ruins the defendant
financially may be unconstitutional under the excessive fines clause of the
Eighth Amendment.344 In a strictly legal sense the absence of contestation
from defendants degrades the court’s ability to foreground the rule of law

342. See JANE ADDAMS, DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL ETHICS 13 (Anne Firor Scott ed., 1964)
(describing how perplexity upon having one’s views challenged through exposure to other people’s
lives can lead to interrogating one’s beliefs, a process Addams contended is necessary for democracy).
343. See generally Colgan, supra note 151.
344. Criminal fines are limited by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines,
meaning fines are unconstitutional if they are disproportionate or, perhaps, if they lead to financial
ruin. Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 682, 694 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that
fines that are ruinous are excessive under the Eighth Amendment (quoting 2 ROBERT VAUGHAN, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLAND UNDER THE HOUSE OF STUART: INCLUDING THE COMMONWEALTH 801
(1840))); Judith Resnik, (Un)Constitutional Punishments Eighth Amendment Silos, Penological
Purposes, and People’s “Ruin,” YALE L.J.F. 365, 367–68 (2020).
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and constitutional issues.345 In a broader sense, the absence of contestation
from defendants prevents courtroom professionals from understanding the
impact of their rulings on defendants as well as their families and
communities.346 Understanding the defendant’s finances may thus be a
“cognitive minimum[]” that the judge must have to exercise the court’s
authority to impose fines fairly and constitutionally.347
It may be argued that judges and prosecutors are aware of the harm
caused by criminal prosecution, monetary sanctions, incarceration, and
the collateral consequences of convictions. If that is the case, listening to
the defendant in court will not produce different results because it will not
produce new knowledge. While this argument may have explanatory
power in some instances, it does not consider that awareness fluctuates. A
judge may be aware of financial hardship, and yet not manage to keep that
awareness top of mind during sentencing. The way in which things we
know can slip from awareness has been described as the “unknown
knowns.”348 The phrase “unknown knowns” plays on Former Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s descriptions of three other categories: known
knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns.349 The fourth
category that this list omits includes the things that we know yet fail take
into consideration when making decisions. What the judge understands of
the hardship caused by the court’s orders may fall within the category of
the “unknown knowns,” that is, “things that were . . . easily knowable, or
indeed known” but which the judge did not think of in the critical moment
of decision.350 To the extent that the harms inflicted in court are the
product of unknown knowns, moments that force conscious awareness
could overcome what otherwise appears to be apathy.
So far, so good. The next question is more difficult. What about the
judge who either does or does not credit the testimony of defendants like
James? At its worst, the result of the defendant’s contestation could be the
345. See Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57
(1998) (defending the adversary system as a method of defending individual rights and dignity); Owen
M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (describing how private
settlement misses the value of litigated dispositions in which a public institution “explicate[s] and
give[s] force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to
interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them”).
346. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1498–99; id. at 1490 (observing that defendant speech about the
impact and fairness of criminal legal practices is often notably missing from court proceedings).
347. MEDINA, supra note 334, at 24.
348. Geoffrey Wheatcroft, A World in Denial of What It Knows, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/opinion/sunday/unknown-knowns-avoiding-the-truth.html
[https://perma.cc/PL9Y-GF7S] (discussing “unknown knowns” as common, political phenomena).
349. Donald H. Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y Def., Press Conference at NATO Headquarters (June 6,
2002), https://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020606g.htm [https://perma.cc/HP8Z-7YQN].
350. Wheatcroft, supra note 348.
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imposition of more severe penalties, including incarceration. As discussed
in Part II, the court’s sovereign power to use violence extends to imposing
harsher penalties when the defendant rejects a plea offer. Other examples
of the judge’s wrath at defendant comportment in court highlight the
sovereign power to punish for talking back.351
In order to benefit from contesting speech, the judge, as a listener, must
feel curious about others and perplexed when the words of others
challenge the listener’s worldview.352 Not all listeners—and not all
judges—are willing to take such a “critical experiential approach” from
the bench.353 Lack of awareness and intransigence form a loop of
reinforcement that can be difficult to break.354 Moreover, some courtroom
professionals may have a vested interest in remaining unaware of
information that challenges their routine practices.355 Understanding, for
example, how often prison is brutal and cruel makes a judge’s job of
sentencing defendants more fraught.356 Likewise, accepting how
devastated many defendants and their families are from criminal justice
debt makes the daily practice of imposing fines more fraught.357 We can
assume, then, that there are some situations in which the court is
impervious to information that challenges its world view and, thus,
defendants talking back in court changes nothing for the defendant or
the judge.
Another, bad faith possibility is that the judge simply does not believe
James’s account of his hardship based on stereotypes that the judge holds
about people like James. Imagine that, when James explains his limited
income and financial obligations, the judge responds, “I see you have new
sneakers and a leather jacket on. You were able to afford those on your
income, so I am sure you can do this. If not, you can always complete fifty
hours of community service picking up trash.”358 As I discuss in another
351. See supra Part II.
352. MEDINA, supra note 334, at 19–20.
353. Id. at 20. Elsewhere, I rejected a direct causal relationship from knowledge acquisition to
policy changes. Hanan, supra note 37.
354. MEDINA, supra note 334, at 85 (noting that intellectual advancement does not automatically
lead to ethical and political improvement).
355. Id. at 34, 109 (describing the epistemic challenges presented by “needing not to know”).
356. Hanan, supra note 37, at 1205–10.
357. At the same time, reducing fines and fees can run afoul of institutional funding goals. The
fines collected may be a necessary stream of revenue for the local government. JACKIE WANG,
CARCERAL CAPITALISM 153–70 (2018).
358. James is now caught in a cycle familiar to people living in lower income, over-policed
neighborhoods, who are cited more often for minor offenses and traffic violations, leading to hundreds
and thousands of dollars in fines. Zhen, supra note 146, at 199 (“[T]raffic courtrooms teem with
minority people who cannot afford to pay their tickets, or who are slapped with a failure to appear
or pay.”).
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article, defendants in criminal cases are often the victims of testimonial
injustice,359 meaning that they are either not invited to provide information
or they are disbelieved when they speak because of prejudicial beliefs held
by the listener.360 James is a member of a stigmatized and discredited
group: criminal defendants. The court may have discredited his words not
based on a fair assessment of his personal credibility but, rather, on a
stereotype about “people like” the speaker.361
If James is Black or Latinx, his speech to the court may be doubly
discredited based on racial or ethnic stereotypes.362 According to Theresa
Zhen, Black defendants are particularly likely to be discredited when they
attempt to explain to the court why they do not have the ability to pay a
fine.363 The judge’s comment about James’s expensive sneakers harkens
to the social construct of an “undeserving poor”—people who are poor
through their choices rather than because of lack of opportunity.364
Moreover, judges who distrust defendants categorically will be
unlikely to provide opportunities for defendants to speak.365 This
359. See generally Hanan, supra note 37. The term “epistemic injustice” was coined by Miranda
Fricker. FRICKER, supra note 335, at 1.
360. FRICKER, supra note 335, at 1.
361. Id. at 23. Fricker addresses the listener’s innocence and culpability at length, but this
discussion is not relevant to this Article. Id. at 20–27.
362. In another context, I have discussed the likelihood that implicit bias may cause judges to
discredit Black defendant’s expressions of remorse. See Hanan, supra note 22.
363. Zhen, supra note 146, at 205 (discussing how the mental construction of two categories of
poor people—the deserving and the undeserving poor—is applied to legal determinations of whether
a defendant’s failure to pay a fine was willful, and, thus, punishable with incarceration). Because only
a willful failure to pay a fine can be punished by incarceration, the court’s determination whether a
defendant’s failure to pay was willful is the difference between incarceration and freedom. Bearden
v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 663–64 (1983) (court must consider defendant’s ability to pay before
revoking his probation and imposing a sentence of incarceration for failure to pay). Zhen relays
instances in which judges found failure to pay willful where (1) a defendant living solely on social
security income admitted that he tithed at church; (2) the defendant appeared to have spent money on
his “physical appearance[]”; and (3) the defendant appeared to have spent money on “manicured
nails.” Zhen, supra note 146, at 208, 213.
364. See Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive Covenant Race, Welfare, and the
Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1540, 1558–59 (2012) (citing
MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON
WELFARE 27–35 (1989)) (discussing the racialized and politically motivated characterization of Black
women who receive public assistance as unwilling to work and manipulative). The ugliest racialized
iteration of the “underserving poor” may be the 1990s trope of the “welfare queen,” who spent
profligately her government subsidies while refusing to work. To the extent that discrediting
testimony about inability to pay based on race or class-based stereotypes, it can be classified as
testimonial injustice. See Bryce Covert, The Myth of the Welfare Queen, NEW REPUBLIC (July 2,
2019), https://newrepublic.com/article/154404/myth-welfare-queen [https://perma.cc/SS7G-QEBK]
(discussing political use of an incident of welfare fraud to create a generalized myth that Black
Americans abuse the public assistance programs and refuse to work).
365. FRICKER, supra note 335, at 130–32 (describing “pre-emptive testimonial injustice”).
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pre-emptive silencing means that any information learned about the
defendant must come from other sources.366 A former defendant described
the experience of being silenced and objectified in court:
The most recent time that I went, I really felt dehumanized. [The
judge] didn’t give me any opportunity to say anything, he was just
like, “You,” and he like, reads my rap sheet off and was like,
“You’re fucked up. Why would you keep on doing this, it really
shows us that you don’t have any respect for the court.” I’m like
“Dude, you have no idea what that rap sheet even means.” He
completely misinterpreted it, the way that he explained it, and
didn’t give me any opportunity to defend myself.367
In the above example, the court’s sources of information about the
defendant were limited to his criminal record and the allegations in the
case. The defendant was objectified—the object of study but not
considered a credible source of information.368
Prejudices leading to testimonial injustice are not completely immune
from challenge. Talking back provides defendants with the opportunity to
highlight their individual identities while “simultaneously pushing into
the background” their stigma of being a defendant in a criminal case.369
The more James speaks to fill in the details of who he is, the less the court
relies on stereotypes and stigma to assess his credibility and orderliness.
Implicit biases—like all unconscious associations—are often triggered by
inadequate information and ambiguity.370 The idea that defendants are
untrustworthy or that some people are poor because they are bad at
managing money are implicit fillers that can be displaced by actual
knowledge about a person’s life. In this sense, talking back by confronting
the court with one’s life circumstances has the potential to displace the
prejudicial assumptions made by the court. If multiple defendants describe
financial hardship, judges might begin to credit the exigencies of poverty
and take a more critical eye toward the imposition of fines in
individual cases.

366. Fricker compares studying a silenced person to studying an object like a tree felled in the
forest that cannot speak, but its rings can be counted to know its age. FRICKER, supra note 335, at
132–33; see also FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN, WHITE MASKS 109 (Charles Lam Markmann trans.,
1967) (1952) (“I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning in things . . . and then I
found that I was an object in the midst of other objects.”).
367. SWANER ET AL., supra note 60, at 30 (alteration in original).
368. See supra section II.A.
369. GRUBER, supra note 22, at 153.
370. Hanan, supra note 22 (discussing implicit biases as triggered by ambiguity and lack
of information).
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Educating Legal Professionals

Defendant speech can pose important challenges to how criminal legal
practices are understood on a systemic level.371 Courtrooms, like other
public institutions, often operate in ignorance of how their practices affect
people. When a social group does not have an opportunity to describe their
experiences—or have those descriptions credited—it creates a
hermeneutical lacuna: an area of social life that is “obscured from
collective understanding.”372 This is an issue of epistemic injustice, which
I discuss in greater depth in a separate article in relation
to incarceration.373
Through silence, criminal legal systems develop narratives, norms, and
practices with little appreciation for the experiences of people charged
with crimes.374 Defendants are thus “excluded from broader social
narratives that give meaning to systemic precepts such as fairness,
deterrence, and punishment.”375 Being excluded from the conversation
“affirmatively shapes the law in ways that further disadvantage” the
excluded group.376
Returning to the vignette of James’s $500 fee, the judge may hold an
erroneous understanding not just of James’s financial circumstances, but
also of the impact of fines and fees on many of the people in the
courtroom, who are most likely in a much lower socioeconomic class than
the judge,377 and upon whom fines and fees are imposed
disproportionately.378 In this example, hermeneutical injustice can be
described as a lack of epistemic clarity about how fines and fees affect
low-income people in general. 379
371. VAN CLEVE, supra note 36, at 177; Simonson, supra note 282 (discussing the democratic
mechanisms of contestation and debate within the framework of criminal justice reform).
372. FRICKER, supra note 335, at 158.
373. Hanan, supra note 37.
374. See, e.g., Nicole Smith Futrell, Vulnerable, Not Voiceless Outsider Narrative in Advocacy
Against Discriminatory Policing, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1616–27 (2015) (discussing how stories of
people subject to discriminatory police actions were deployed in “the anti-stop and frisk movement”).
For a seminal article discussing the role of narratives in challenges dominant views of legal regimes,
see Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2411 (1989).
375. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1452.
376. Id. at 1501.
377. See Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137,
142 (2013).
378. See Daniel S. Harawa, How Much Is Too Much? A Test to Protect Against Excessive Fines,
81 OHIO ST. L.J. 65 (2020).
379. MEDINA, supra note 334, at 31 (describing decision-makers who never hear critiques of their
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Hermeneutical injustice frustrates policy improvements. To put it
differently, imagine that ten defendants in a row told the judge, “I can pay
that but it will mean my daughter cannot attend afterschool programs;”
and “I can pay that but we will not be able to buy fresh fruit for the kids’
lunches for these five months;” and “I can pay that but I will have to take
the bus because I can’t afford this and gas and insurance for the car;” and
“I can pay that but I will have to go off my prescription medication
because I cannot pay these fines and pay the co-pay for them.” If only one
defendant complains of the impact of a $500 fine, the court might assume
the defendant was an outlier experiencing bad financial luck. If, however,
every defendant raises concrete examples of financial hardship, what may
have seemed like bad luck now looks more like systemic injustice that the
court’s rulings should account for.380 If defendants spoke openly about the
harm that fines and fees worked on their lives and their families, fines and
fees are more likely to be viewed as a social injustice. Evidence would
mount to support the credible claim of advocates and scholars who have
labeled criminal fees and fines as a “faux-taxation scheme that
circumvents the traditional political process and is predicated on racially
discriminatory stops.”381
Expanding beyond the example of fines and fees, to the extent that
defendants feel comfortable saying what has happened to them during
their arrest, in the jail, and in court, they educate legal actors about the
harms caused by criminal legal practices. Some of the harms may be the
product of idiosyncratic luck, but other harms may be systemic injustices
that merit amelioration. In sum, an advantage of defendant speech is to
add to our collective knowledge about the impact of criminal legal system
policies, from policing to punishment. In contrast, silencing defendants
impedes our ability to see harms and define injustice.382 As Sharon
Dolovich and Alexandra Natapoff have argued: “[T]his reality [of
criminal legal practices] is lived by flesh-and-blood human beings, a fact

actions as “ruling without resistance”). In-depth journalism like Barbara Ehrenreich’s Nickle and
Dimed and, more recently, Jessica Bruder’s Nomadland chronicle the financial struggles largely
invisible to wealthier people. See BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKLE AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING
BY IN AMERICA (2001); JESSICA BRUDER, NOMADLAND: SURVIVING AMERICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2017).
380. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 80–82 (1990) (arguing that the line between bad
luck and injustice is drawn by societies in response to their understanding of various, concrete harms).
381. Zhen, supra note 146, at 179 (describing how the racial economic divide is exacerbated by
over-policing, leading to citations for traffic and minor crimes, leading to a disproportionate amount
of fines and fees owed by people of color).
382. KARAKATSANIS, supra note 126, at 147 (arguing that lawyers must “catalog, appreciate, and
interrogate the negative costs” of criminal legal practices in order to evaluate the injustice of those
practices accurately).
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that the standard focus on formal rules and processes tends to ignore, but
which must be front and center in any morally adequate understanding of
the criminal system.”383
C.

Contestation and Democracy

Talking back in court is good for the democratic aspects of criminal
legal practices.384 Judicial decisions are not a matter of public opinion, of
course.385 But, the plurality of “the people” served by the judicial branch
includes defendants, their families, and their communities.386 The judge is
thus not the only audience in court. Everyone in the courtroom is the
audience for the defendant’s speech. Illustrating the importance of the
criminal court as a public sphere, attorney and director of the Southern
Center for Human Rights, Steve Bright, stood up from his seat in the
audience of a criminal court one day and asked the judge to speak up.387
Initially, the judge reacted defensively, ordering Mr. Bright to stand
before the court, which Mr. Bright eventually did.388 He took the
opportunity to remind the court of its function as a transparent, public
forum, stating:
People have a right to hear what is going on. We’re all here,
missing work, having left our children in the care of others. And
we want to hear what is going on in court today. You are denying
us our right to listen to a public hearing. So if you wouldn’t mind,
please speak up.389
Although few trials occur, the courtroom remains a public space where
the government’s actions can be viewed and judged.390 Many in the
audience of the criminal court will have the opportunity to participate in
other aspects of criminal law, like voting for candidates who will pass or
383. Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff, Introduction, in THE NEW CRIMINAL JUSTICE
THINKING 1, 9 (Sharon Dolovich & Alexandra Natapoff eds., 2017).
384. Legal scholars continue to debate the relationship between democracy and criminal legal
practices. See generally Lauren M. Ouziel, Democracy, Bureaucracy, and Criminal Justice Reform,
61 B.C. L. REV. 523, 524 (2020) (applying a “democracy/bureaucracy framework” to analyze areas
of political transition in criminal justice).
385. Indeed, some legal scholars have critiqued mass incarceration as an excess of democratic
influence on criminal law’s sense of fair punishment. E.g., RACHEL ELISE BARKOW, PRISONERS OF
POLITICS: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF MASS INCARCERATION 5 (2019).
386. See generally Jocelyn Simonson, The Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119
COLUM. L. REV. 249 (2019).
387. BACH, supra note 23, at 35.
388. Id. at 35–36.
389. Id.
390. Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2173 (2014).
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repeal criminal statutes, voting for the next District Attorney, and, in some
states, voting for judges. Defendants who talk back in court contest the
fairness of criminal legal practices, providing the audience with more
information upon which to exercise their voting and speech rights.391
The voices of the people most affected by criminal legal practices often
go unheard.392 In low-income communities—many of them primarily
Black or Latinx—more than half of the men are under criminal
supervision, including prison, parole, or probation.393 This form of
“governing through crime” makes the need for democratic participation
through speech all the more essential.394
Importantly, democracy’s emphasis on pluralism as a source of
strength suggests that the exclusion of certain people and perspectives
from public discourse degrades democracy.395 Dissent and protest are
essential ways of ensuring that all perspectives are heard.396 Especially
because criminal legal practices are shaped by insiders: police, lawyers,
judges, prison guards, parole officers, and other bureaucrats,397 pluralistic
public critique is essential. While it is true that people affected by criminal
legal practices are increasingly invited to speak to lawmakers and
agencies that oversee criminal justice, their participation does not always

391. MEDINA, supra note 334, at 5–6; see also Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal
Justice, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1367, 1387 (2017) (arguing that the ethical life of society should be
reflected in the laws, and, inter alia, that lay citizens take part in it and see their sense of justice at
work in criminal legal systems).
392. See generally Hanan, supra note 37.
393. In 2018, 4.5 million people in the U.S. were under some form of community supervision based
on a criminal court case, and 2.3 million people were in prison. ALEXI JONES, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE, CORRECTIONAL CONTROL 2018: INCARCERATION AND SUPERVISION BY STATE (2018),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/correctionalcontrol2018.html [https://perma.cc/G827-MZAH].
In 2015, 30% of people on supervision were Black and 13% were Latinx. BUREAU OF JUST. STAT.,
OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE UNITED STATES,
2015 (2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus15_sum.pdf [https://perma.cc/3A8HHCLQ].
394. Natapoff, supra note 6, at 1490 (citing Jonathan Simon, Crime, Community and Criminal
Justice, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1415, 1416–17 (2002)); DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL:
CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 165 (2001). Natapoff argues that defendant
speech is a “First Amendment opportunity,” and not just a “Fifth Amendment problem.” Natapoff,
supra note 6, at 1492.
395. See David Alan Sklansky, Populism, Pluralism, and Criminal Justice, 107 CALIF. L. REV.
2009, 2011–12 (2019) (noting that the motto “E Pluribus Unum” implies that “criminal justice policies
that dehumanize criminal suspects, criminal defendants, and incarcerated people” are a threat to
democratic governance because they exclude these groups from “the People” who govern).
396. CHANTAL MOUFFE, AGONISTICS: THINKING THE WORLD POLITICALLY (2013) (arguing the
benefits of a particular type of contestation in politics).
397. Simonson, supra note 282, at 1610 (criticizing the anti-democratic tendencies of criminal legal
practices that are “run and maintained by privileged insiders” and “rarely responsive to the interests
of the poor populations of color most likely to come into contact with the system”).
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include the kind of open contestation that can occur in the
courtroom setting.398
Defendants speaking for themselves in court is not the same as an
organized social movement,399 but it is resistance, and a kind of resistance
that does not just land on the ears of the courtroom professionals, but on
the ears of the public in the audience as well.400 The goal is not necessarily
to build consensus around a particular issue. Rather, defendants talking
back represent diverse and multiple points of resistance to criminal legal
practices.401 Because power is diffuse and multifaceted, resistance must
be “present everywhere in the power network.”402 “Hence,” thought
Foucault, “there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt,
source of all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is
a plurality of resistances, each of them a special case.”403 Even sporadic,
disorganized talking back provides useful contestation to diffuse power
through the multiplicity of voices.404
CONCLUSION
When one considers not just sovereign power, but also disciplinary and
social-emotional power, it becomes apparent that simply inviting
defendants to speak in court will not produce effective opportunities for
defendants to talk back. Displaying orderliness and agreeability is
paramount in courtrooms, whether they are friendly or unfriendly in their
approach to defendants.
Ameliorating the injustice of defendant silencing might be achieved by
398. Id. at 1612.
399. Organized groups watch police, collect money to pay bails, and protest in public spaces to
demonstrate direct resistance. Id. at 1617–19 (arguing the value of organized resistance to criminal
legal practices).
400. See Carroll, supra note 25.
401. MEDINA, supra note 334, at 13–14; see also Eric J. Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58
HOW. L.J. 521, 549–50 (2015) (arguing in favor of more diverse participation in public
decision-making); Elizabeth Anderson, The Epistemology of Democracy, 3 EPISTEME 8, 12 (2006)
(describing conditions under which a random group of diverse people would solve problems more
satisfactorily than a specialized, homogenous group); Hélène Landemore, Deliberation, Cognitive
Diversity, and Democratic Inclusiveness An Epistemic Argument for the Random Selection of
Representatives, 190 SYNTHESE 1209, 1212–19 (2013) (arguing that diversity of perspectives is an
advantage in deliberations).
402. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 79 (Robert Hurley
trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1976).
403. Id.
404. MEDINA, supra note 334, at 289 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”:
LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1975–1976 (Mauro Bertani, Alessandro Fontana & François
Ewald eds., David Macey trans., 2003) (1997)) (discussing plurality of views as part of the
“insurrection of subjugated knowledges”).
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better legal representation in the lower courts.405 But it is not clear that
lawyers fare better than defendants in resisting the pressure to be
agreeable. Because they are institutional actors who interact with the same
prosecutors and judges every day, defense attorneys often feel compelled
to appease those with power over their clients rather than press issues that
the prosecutor and judge might view unfavorably.406 Indeed, lawyers are
susceptible to the same power dynamics as defendants, particularly
disciplinary and social-emotional power. This may be why they often
press their clients to be silent and decorous.407 And, lawyers fear some
forms of sovereign power. In a case in which a judge threatened to
incarcerate an attorney for cross-examining the police officer during a
bench trial, the lawyer acknowledged that, knowing that the judge had
incarcerated lawyers for advocacy before, he tempered his defense of his
client.408 This fear of losing everything from professional status in the
courtroom to liberty silences defense attorneys as well as defendants.
Another possibility for improving dispositional advocacy for
misdemeanor defendants is the assistance of lay advocates who can
assume the risk of being seen as disorderly and disruptive when the
misdemeanor defendant cannot.409 In the context of reducing and tailoring
sub-carceral conditions, community advocates and family members may
be better equipped to understand the defendant’s circumstances and
communicate them to the court than either the defendant or an attorney
unfamiliar with the defendant. Initiatives such as the Participatory
Defense Movement are equipped to take on such a challenge.410
405. There is certainly an argument to be made for providing representation to all criminal
prosecutions, particularly because the collateral consequences of conviction can be so severe. Roberts,
supra note 2, at 277 (“Yet the consequences of even the most ‘minor’ misdemeanor conviction can
be far reaching, and include deportation, sex offender registration, and loss of public housing and
student loans.”).
406. BACH, supra note 23, at 6 (“When a lawyer is forced to choose between performing vigorously
in his role as an adversary and maintaining easy and necessary professional institutional and
relationships, he often opts for the path of least resistance, which undermines justice for some.”).
407. Natapoff, supra note 6.
408. FERGUSON REPORT, supra note 161, at 44.
409. Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real About Gideon The Next Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to
Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1339–41 (2013) (comparing the role of nurses and
physician’s assistants to the potential role of non-attorney advocates in criminal cases); Donald A.
Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 113, 127–28 (2012).
410. The amplification of the voices of people charged with crimes also occurs through
community-based efforts like the Participatory Defense Movement. Cynthia Godsoe, Participatory
Defense Humanizing the Accused and Ceding Control to the Client, 69 MERCER L. REV. 715 (2018);
Janet Moore, Marla Sandys & Raj Jayadev, Make Them Hear You Participatory Defense and the
Struggle for Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281 (2014). Founded by Raj Jayadev, the
Participatory Defense Movement assists the defendant’s family members and community members
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Given the multiple layers of power at work in the courtroom setting, it
is difficult to see a way for defendants to talk back in court. Yet, their
voices are paramount to cataloging catalog the costs, harms, and injustices
attendant to being the target of criminal prosecution.

in organize to assist in the defense. Moore et al., supra, at 1284–85. The movement rests on the claim
that, while expertise has merit, the community that supports the defendant is a source of knowledge
and social power that is valuable to the defendant’s case. Godsoe, supra, at 719; Moore et al., supra,
at 1284–85. Defendant family and community members can organize to “humanize” and
“contextualize” the defendant, two important aspects of dispositional advocacy. Godsoe, supra,
at 720.

